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• VERBA VOLANT SCRIPTA MANENT 
University of San Diego School of Law 
Volume 39, Issue 6 March 2004 
SCALIA COMES TO USD 
U.S. Supreme Courl Justice and two other distinguished 
jurists judge final round of the McLennan Moot Courl Competition 
FOR MOOT COURT 
COVERAGE, 
PLEASE SEE 
INSIDE PAGE 8 
ALSO INSIDE 
THIS ISSUE: 
The Gay Marriage Debate 
-- page 4 
Case notes 




-- page 15 
CORPORATE-OWNED LIFE 
INSURANCE, OR 
"HOW MUCH ARE YOU WORTH 
TO YOUR EMPLOYER?" 
By Nicole Rothstein 
Staff Writer 
Have you ever wanted to know how 
much you are worth to your employer? Well, it 
may be a lot more than you expect and for all 
the wrong reasons. In fact, you may be worth 
more to your employer dead than alive. 
Jane Sims thought her husband was 
a valuable employee to Wal-Mart. She just 
didn't know how valuable. He had worked in 
the receiving department at one of Wal-Mart's 
distribution centers for eleven years when 
h e died in 1998 of a sudden heart attack. 
Unbeknownst to Jane, after his death Wal-Mart 
collected $64,000. Jane herself got nothing. 
What she discovered is that Wal-Mart, the 
company her husband Douglas worked for 
before h e died, had taken out a life insurance 
policy in his name. 
Wal-Mart isn't the only American 
corporation that fattens its bottom line in this 
manner. The coverage is called broad-based 
insurance, corporate-owned life insurance, or 
just COLI. For decades, a corporation or an 
individual wanting to buy life insurance on 
someone else had to have a significant financial 
or emotional stake (known as an "insurable 
interest") in the person's survival. Companies 
Please see COLI at page 15 
f'1~ Hon. •ntonhi Se;;1H:i 
JUDGES 
RESPOND TO STUDENT 
MOOT COURT 
QUESTIONS 
By Damien Schiff 
Editor 
As part of the events leading up to the 
finals of the McLennan Moot Court Competition, 
Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States 
Supreme Court, Circuit Judge Michael Hawkins 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, and Justice Judith Haller of the 
California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
were present to answer University of San Diego 
School of Law students' queries at two question 
and answer sessions. Both sessions were held 
Monday, February 16, at the Kroc Institute for 
Peace and Justice. 
The morning session consisted of two 
dozen or so law students, representing various 
school organizations, in a conversation with the 
three illustrious judges, moderated by USD Law 
Professor (and former Scalia law clerk) Michael 
Ramsey. 
Not surprisingly, the first question 
posed to the jurists concerned the recent 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision requiring the state legislature to 
sanction same-sex marriages. Asked how 
the issue might become a federal one, Justice 
Scalia responded that the question of same-sex 
marriages would most likely make it to federal 
court as a Full Faith and Credit Clause matter 
(see Art. N, § 1). Notwithstanding his professed 
conservatism, the justice added, in reference to 
the attackers of same-sex marriage, that "it 
is a little too late to talk about the sanctity of 
marriage" in America; and he cited Ms. Brittany 
Spears' one day union as a case in point. 
Justice Haller noted that California voters 
recently approved a referendum that, at least 
facially, would prohibit the state's recognition of 
same-sex marriages. In light of some California 
municipalities' recent recognition of same-sex 
marriages, Justice Haller anticipated court 
challenges to those city ordinances based upon 
the referendum. 
Responding to one student's query as 
to which newspapers they were accustomed 
to reading, the august jurisconsults gave 
widely varying answers. Justice Scalia reads 
the Washington Post and Washington Times; 
Judge Hawkins the New York Times, the 
Arizona Republic and about a dozen on-line 
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It's time once again for the VSD School 
of Law Public Interest Law Foundation LOAN 
REPAYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (LRAP) 
pledge drive. LRAP helps USD law grads repay 
their law school loans if they choose a career 
in public interest law. Any USD grad who 
works in a public interest law position that 
pays $40,000 or less and who has no more 
than $50,000 in law school loans is eligible. 
The Pledge drive is the main source of 
income for our school's LRAP fund. Th anks 
to the support of Dean Rodriguez, faculty, 
students, and all those who contributed 
past pledge drives have raised over $30,000! 
During the week of March 8th - 12th, 
PILF students will be visiting you and h ave a 
table in the Writs to ask for donations. Any 
assistance you can provide would be greatly 
appreciated and assist in the provision of 
legal services to low-income individuals and 
traditionally under-represented interests 
through LRAP. Your donation is tax deductible! 
** A prize will be given to the largest donor 
for each day. There will also be a raffle each 




Mid-semester is h ere and spring break is fast a pproaching. It has 
been a busy semester so far, and so much more to come in the next 
weeks and months. 
Upcoming in March: The Hon. H. Lee Sarokin will moderate a 
distinguished panel discussing "Secret Settlements vs. The Public 
Interest," on Thursday, March 25 at 7 :00 p .m. in the Peace & 
Justice Theatre of the Kroc Institute. Distinguished Professor Carl 
A. Auerbach will be honored for h is more than 55 years of academic 
March 2004 
service and his 20 years at USD School of Law, at a special reception and program on Friday, 
March 26, again at the Institute for Peace & Justice. Saturday, March 27 finds the action still on 
campu s but at another venue. Preparations are currently underway for an evening of fun at "The 
Golden Anniversary Casino" (a/ k /a The Degheri Alumni Center). The event is sponsored by the 
Law School and the SBA, and will feature fun, gambling, some 50th anniversary memories, and 
much more. A peek into our busy April calendar reveals the visit of Justice John Paul Stevens of 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Stevens will deliver the 20th Nathanson Memorial 
Lectu re on Wednesday, April 7. The big 50th Anniversary Gala Weekend comes up on April 23-25. 
Watch for details on these and other events. 
I am sorry to r eport that our community has been touch ed by the deaths of 2 former faculty and 
on e generous and dedicated benefactor. Distinguished Professor Herb Peterfreund passed away 
in January at the age of 90. Professor Peterfreund practiced law in New York City and served as 
a captain in the infantry, U.S. Army (1942-46) before m ovin g to academia in 1947 . He tau ght 
at New York University Law School for more than thirty years, where h e was Frederick I. and 
Grace A. Stokes Professor of Law, and Stokes Professor Emeritus, before coming to USD in 1978. 
Professor Peterfreund was a familiar and friendly face around the Law School until his retirement 
in 1995. Professor Michael Navin, current law professor and co-director of the Agricultural Law 
Center at the Dickinson School of Law at Penn State, died on February 25. After several years of 
private law practice with a major firm in Seattle, Washington, Mike Navin joined th e faculty of the 
Willamette University College of Law, from which he later moved on to a 14-year tenure on the USD 
Law School faculty, from 1973-1987. In 1997 Professor Navin became the seventh dean of The 
Dickinson School of Law and h as served on that faculty continuously s ince then. Although Mike 
Navin left USD in 1987, his ties to our campus remained strong. He and Herb Peterfreund will be 
missed and ch erished in our history and memories. 
Mr. George Pardee, a long-time friend of the University and a generou s b enefactor of our law 
sch ool, passed away on February 23 at th e age of 87. The names of George and Katherine Pardee 
are proudly attached permanently to our Pardee Legal Research Center. We mourn his passing 
just as we celebrate in our thoughts and prayers his productive and philanthropic life. 
I wish all of our community a happy and restorative Spring Break. 
NOTE TO THE READERS 
From the Editor, 
Some of the readership will no doubt recognize a few changes with this edition of Motions. 
To begin with, the newspaper has acquired a new formatting program that, it is hoped, will greatly 
increase the appearance (if not content) of the publication. Secondly, astute perusers will h ave 
noticed by now that no issue a ppeared for the month of February. No slight is intended toward 
that great month (indeed, not the cruelest, and the only which qccasionally really does last longer 
than usual). Rather, th e absence of a February edition is due in large measure to a change in 
technology and computer equipment. Thirdly, especially sharp readers will h ave noticed a change 
in the p aper 's m asthead, and specifically in the m otto a ppearing at the top of page one. Formerly 
that m otto read , "ACTA SEMPER VERUS COMMODUM," which phrase, shocking though it may 
seem , is pure mumbo-jumbo. Although each word is a genuine Latin verbum, strung together they 
are meaningless (and I challenge any lawyer philologist-classicist to show the contrary). Conse-
quently, after som e d ebate and research, a new motto was chosen, thank s to the apt suggestion of 
the Reverend Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J., presently of the University of Scranton. Father Tylenda is 
well qualified to proffer a Latin m otto, as the esteemed translator of Thomas a Kempis's Imitation 
of Christ and other Latin works. The new motto, "VERBA VOLANT SCRIPT A MANENT," is espe-
cially apropos to a newsp aper. And properly to solemnize the occasion, Motions will give one Initial 
Portable DVD-9510 Player to each of the first two persons to translate correctly the new motto into 
English, and to send said translation, with proper identification, to the paper's e-mail address. 
HOW CAN YOU HELP A CHILD? 
Volunteer! San Diego's abused and neglected chil-
dren need you. There are over 7,500 children in foster 
care waiting for help. Become a child advocate today. 
Serve as~ Court Appointed Special Prosecutor (CASA). 
You'll be glad you did. All training provided. Volun-
teers research the case, gather information, attend 
court hearings, and lend support to the child. The 
next information sessions will be March 24 and April 
14. Call Voices for Children at (858) 569-2019 or visit 




Q & A, from page 1 
publications; and Justice Haller often peruses 
the Union-Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and 
the Daily Journal. Justice Scalia also noted 
that, generally speaking, the press do a poor 
job in reporting -legal news. They are concerned 
with informing the readership whether the "good 
guy" or the "bad guy" won, and not whether the 
court properly applied the law. But the average 
Joe is more interested in the press's simplistic 
characterization, even though it is a caricature 
of the judicial process. 
Asked about the importance of an 
independent judiciary, Justice Scalia admitted 
his preference for life-tenured judg~s, but 
stressed · that, if the people want to elect their 
judges, then the candidates must not be 
constrained from speaking to the issues. Thus 
did the justice rationalize his Court's recent 
decision in White v. Minnesota, in which a state 
law forbidding judicial candidates' discussion of 
their personal opinions regarding issues likely 
to come before them was held to violate the First 
Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. / 
Justice Scalia was then queried whether 
in his opinion foreign law or jurisprudence 
has any role to play in interpreting the federal 
constitution. Succinctly the justice retorted that 
foreign law and legal notions have absolutely no 
role to play, and ought not to, unless one adopts 
the "evolving meaning'' theory of constitutional 
interpretation. But that theory produces an 
"empty bottle" permitting constant evolution in 
meaning: "We may evolve into Frenchmen, God 
help us." 
Discussion turned to the American 
Association of Law Schools (AALS) and its 
controversial position concerning JAG Corps 
recruiters. The AALS, as a matter of policy, 
forbids its members to allow JAG Corps 
recruiters on their campuses, because of the 
military's allegedly discriminatory "don't ask 
don't tell" policy for homosexuals. Justice 
Scalia's opinion of the AALS? "Intolerantly · 
tolerant." 
And recusal? "No comment." 
What about legal education at Yale? 
"Yale is a lousy law school." 
When questioned about their law clerk 
hiring practices, all the panelists professed 
willingness to hire outside the much-ballyhooed 
"Top Ten" law schools. Justice Scalia noted 
that he has often hired outside the top tier; 
but even if Harvard and Yale are bad schools, 
it nonetheless remains the case that the best 
minds are attracted to them. And whatever one 
might conclude about the legal education that 
the elite schools provide, it is not so bad as to 
spoil minds that were good before matriculation. 
Judge Hawkins chimed in, arguing that "really 
good law students are good wherever they are." 
As for grades and school reputation, Justice 
Haller reassured the attendees that most 
academic accolades are helpful in finding the 
first post-graduation job, but after that, one is 
measured by one's job performance. 
The morning could not of course pass 
without a question to Justice Scalia on his 
avowed textualism. "I do not use intent . .. 
I do not care about the intent of the Framers 
[as opposed to original understanding] . . . I do 
not use legislative history." But stare decisis 
requires that some cases, although wrongly 
decided, be followed. They are like "water over 
the dam." "I do not propose ripping up every 
decision," but only th.ose decisions that present 
issues incapable of judicial - as opposed to 
legislative - resolution, an example of the latter 
being the abortion cases. A democratic society 
should solve these judicially unresolvable 
problems by passing laws, not by deferring to 
"a bunch of lawyers." The Bill of Rights is ·but 
a narrow exception to the rule of democracy; 
the constitution is not meant to be a medium of 
change. 
And what about RICO, Justice Scalia? 
"It's a lousy statute." 
Asked about the judicial appointment 
process, Judge Hawkins declared flatly, "I 
think the process is broken." How has this 
happened, Justice Scalia? "The Court has 
made itself a political institution . . . With five · 
hands the Court can do anything." Thus the 
politicization of the confirmation process is but 
MOTIONS March 2004 
MAKING THE GRADE - , 
LAW SCHOOL CONSIDERS CHANGES TO ITS GRADING SYSTEM 
By Jonathan Meislin 
Staff Writer 
What's wrong with USD? After all, the national ranking is rising, the campus is beautiful, 
the weather is perfect, and the beach is close by. The answer, many claim, is the grade distribution 
a consequence of the Court's self-politicization. system. USD uses one of the strictest grading 
Justice Scalia, when asked how it can curves in the nation. The median student can 
be that Justice Clarence Thomas is considered expect to get a C under the current system, as 
more a "Scalian textualist" than Scalia himself, opposed to the B curve used by most other law 
responded that the charge simply is false. In schools. The proposed solution, supported and 
fact, the greatest difference between the two, represented by the Student Bar Association 
argued Scalia, is that "my Brother Clarence (SBA), is to inflate USD's grade distribution 
does not believe in stare decisis." system to be comparable to other schools' 
Your opinion, Justice Scalia, on the systems. This change will give USD graduates 
Ninth Amendment? "The Ninth Amendment is a much deserved edge in the job market, and 
a laugher." Well then, what about the Tenth? will eliminate the awkward moment when USD 
"The Tenth Amendment is just a reiteration of students have to explain to their interviewer 
the whole framework of the Constitution." that they are a victim of a strict grading system. 
The afternoon question and answer Although there is a lot of student and faculty 
session presented a larger audience and similar support for the new system, the specifics have 
questions. But when asked about judicial not yet been worked out. 
activism, the jurists provided fresh quips. With the increasing competition among 
Judge Hawkins compared judicial activism to law schools, many students are finding it hard 
what H.L. Mencken defined as an alcoholic: an to get a job or an internship despite USD's 
alcoholic is someone you don't like who drinks prestigious ranking and amenities. USD 
just as much as you; thus a judicial activist is is ranked the 59th best law school in the 
someone whose decisions you don't agree with. nation, the. third best law school in Southern 
Justice Haller defended the courts generally, California, and the best law school in San 
arguing that day in day out "we Liudges] do our Diego, according to US News & World Report. 
job in a routine way ... we do justice." Beyond the rankings, USD's bar pass rate was 
Justice Scalia was pressed on his an astounding eighty-three percent, higher than 
textualism. What about Brown v. Board of many of the more highly ranked law schools 
Education? How would that case have turned in California, only surpassed by Stanford, 
out if presented to a Scalian court? The justice Berkeley and UCLA. For a school with so 
responded that the questioner was "waiving much to offer, USD's students still compete in 
the bloody red shirt of Brown." At one level, a an uphill battle against other law schools that 
textualist can argue that the result would have use the already inflated curving system. This 
been the same. But at another, deeper, level is a problem because most employers will not 
the textualist can argue that it does not matter, number-crunch to figure out if a student from 
because no theory of interpretation can produce USD with a lower GPA is more qualified than 
likeable results in every case. Even "a stopped a student from another school who boasts 
clock is right twice a day." Without textualism a higher and facially more impressive GPA. 
and originalism, the people will be unable to Although some employers now understand 
control a life-tenured judiciary gone crazy over USD's strict grade distribution system, many 
the "living constitution malarkey." do not, especially employers located outside 
The panelists were asked to name the of San Diego. Stu~ents from USD who are in 
jurist whom they most admired. For both competition with students from schools like 
Justice Scalia and Judge Hawkins, it was USC, Davis and Hastings, start with a hurdle to 
Robert Jackson: Supreme Court Justice, overcome, despite the fact that USD's ranking 
courageous dissenter in the reviled Korematsu is becoming more and more comparable to such 
v. United States, Attorney General under schools. 
Franklin Roosevelt; a man who attended Even though grade inflation may seem 
neither 'law school nor college but was entirely like the right answer, many complications still 
an autodidact. Of hirri said Scalia, "he writes lie ahead. For instance, the new system may 
like an angel." For Justice Haller, Chief Justice aid future students entering USD, but it is 
Marshall deserved high praise, but so too unclear which members of the current student 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor for having been body will benefit from the curve inflation. This 
the first female member of the U.S. Supreme may be a problem for those who are competing 
Court. for jobs with students from lower classes who 
When questioned about the Ninth will benefit from the grade inflation. This 
Circuit's high reversal rate by the Supremes, is the case for the dual-degree and evening 
Judge Hawkins affably replied, "I don't know students, who will graduate in four years and 
what the Supreme Court would do for fun compete with students from the classes below. 
without my court." Will they be disadvantaged from the grade 
Should we care what the Europeans distribution system because they graduated 
think about our federal c_onstitution? Said with a class that had the benefit of the inflated 
Justice Scalia: "We have a lot of stuff in [the grade distribution system? What about future 
Constitution] that is not European, and thank employment opportunities, where students who 
God!" graduated only a year apart from one another 
How, Justice Scalia, should an will look different on paper, despite their actual 
originalist law student avoid altercation with qu alifications? These details have not been 
differently-minded law professors? Not easy to worked out. One possible solution is to apply 
say, he responded, but one can still agree with the grade inflation to all students, or at least 
a position held by a person one does not like. to all current students. This option was used 
After all, in Texas v. Johnson (the flag burning at Willamette, where all students' grades were 
case), Scalia came out for, in his words, a inflated, no matter what class they were in . 
"scruffy, sandal-wearing bearded weird-a." But (See: Bell Curve Ball, The National Jurist, page 4, 
if not originalism, argued the Justice, by what January 2004.) USC is another school that. has 
principle would these non-originalis t professors inflated its grading system. USC's solution does 
limit the discretion of unelected judges? not apply retroactively, but the inflated grading 
Lastly, the panelists were asked what system will change in form, so employers will 
made them choose law as their profession. For not be so confused. USC's new system will 
Judge Hawkins, the starting point was a city use a 1. 9-4.4 grading scale, as opposed to 
council meeting in his home state of Arizona, .its original 65-90 grading scale . (See http: 
where a very unfriendly council was persuaded //lawweb.usc.edu/students/handbook/sec-
to go the other way because of a lawyer's oral 6.8.html#a.) 
argument. For Justice Haller, it was a personal The grade distribution system is USD's 
challenge in a time when the legal culture was next step to becoming more competitive. The. 
hostile to women lawyers. But for Justice details are expected to be worked out in the next 
Scalia, he could thank "Uncle Vince," who few months, and p ossibly applied to students' 
convinced a freshly eollege-graduated Nino that grades by next semester. Un til then, students 
the lawyer's life was not so bad after all. can only look forward in anticipation. 
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THE GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE: 
LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVES 
By David Moynihan 
Special to Motions 
Two opinions by the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts have together spawned a 
controversy over same-sex marriages that 
has brought into ql.J.estion the propriety of 
the public policy against persons of the same 
sex marrying each another. Although the 
legislatures of thirty-eight states have spoken 
definitively against the union of persons of the 
same sex, the Massachusetts high court, in an 
opinion signed by three justices with one other 
concurring in the judgment, and over three 
dissents, found the Commonwealth's statute 
limiting marriage to two persons of the opposite 
sex invalid (Goodridge I). Incredibly, the court's 
subsequent opinion (concerning the remedy 
required of the Massachusetts legisla~ure) 
changes without explanation the basis . for 
the first ruling. This article examines the 
jurisprudence - or lack thereof - displayed 
by the court, and in no way is meant to enter 
into the debate as to how public policy should 
resolve the matter. 
Goodridge I 
To quote an earlier Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, who spent more than half of his 
96 years as a justice, first in Massachusetts and 
then on th e U.S. Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. opined: "Upon this point a page of 
history is worth a volume of logic." The present 
Chief Justice graces us with these facts : 
The plaintiffs are fourteen 
individuals, from -five 
Massachusetts counties. As of 
April 11, 2001, the date they filed 
their complaint, the plaintiffs, 
Gloria .. ., sixty years old, and . ( 
Lmda ... fifty-five years old had 
been in a committed relationship 
for thirty years; the plaintiffs 
Maureen .. . , forty nine years 
old, and Ellen ... fifty-two years 
old, had been nine a committed 
relationship for twenty years and 
iived with their twelve year old 
daughter, the plaintiffs Hillary 
. .. forty-four years old, and Julie, 
forty-three years old, have been 
in a committed relationship for 
thirteen years and lived with 
their five year old daughter; 
the plaintiffs Gary .. .. , thirty-
five years old, and Richard ... 
thirty-seven years old, had been 
in a committed relationship for 
thirteen years and lived with 
their eight year old daughter and 
Richard's mother; the plaintiffs 
Heidi, thirty-six years old and 
Gina , thirty-six years old, had 
been in a committed relationship 
for eleven years and lived with 
their two sons, aged five tears 
old and one year, the plaintiffs 
Michael . . . forty-one years and 
David ... forty-one years old had 
been in a committed relationship 
for seven years, and the plaintiffs 
David . . . fifty-seven years old, 
and Robert, fifty-one years 
old had been in a committed 
relationship for four years and 
had cared for David's mother 
in theory homes after a serious 
illness until she died. 
With these facts we anticipate that the decision 
will show us the relevance of the plaintiffs' 
mature years, or the length of their commitment, 
or how people who care for their parents should 
be allowed to marry. But wait, there's more! 
The plaintiffs include business 
Please see Moynihan at page 5 
By Nicole Rothstein 
Staff Writer 
In the nation's most far reaching decision of 
its kind, the Massachusetts . Supreme Judicial 
Court, in a 4-3 ruling, cleared the way this 
m onth for same-sex couples in the state to 
marry, ruling that government attorneys "failed 
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason" 
to deny them the right. In response to a request 
from the Massachusetts Senate for clarification 
of the court's decision last November and 
for a ruling on its proposed Bill No. 2175, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed that the state constitution requires 
the recognition of same-sex marriage not just 
civil unions. The Massachusetts Legislature 
has been given six months to rewrite the state's 
marriage laws for the benefit of same-sex 
couples. 
According to the court's latest opinion, 
the. issue considered in Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health was not only whether it is proper 
to withhold the tangible and intangible benefits 
of unions from same-sex couples, but also 
whether it is constitutional to create a separate 
class of citizens and withhold from that class 
the right to participate in the institution of 
civil marriage itself. 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 
Calling the issue a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, and not mere social policy, the 
majority held that marriage, being a basic civil 
right, if offered to straight couples, cannot 
be denied to gay or lesbian couples without 
branding the latter as second-class citizens. 
Thus, even civil unions "would have the effect of 
maintaining and f9stering a stigma of exclusion 
that the Constitution prohibits." 
Quite frankly, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court should be applauded for its 
common sense opinion-which rightly rejected 
the state's plainly discriminatory justifications 
for denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry. Pointing to the considerable defects of 
rationality within the state's arguments, the 
court held that "segregating same-sex unions 
from opposite sex unions cannot possibly be 
held to rationally advance or preserve ... the 
Commonwealth's legitimate interests in 
procreation, child-rearing, and the conservation 
of resources." 
The State first asserted that it wanted 
to provide a favorable setting for procreation. If 
procr~ation is indeed the crucial concern, then 
what about citizens over childbearing age or 
those unable to have children naturally? As 
the court noted in its earlier opinion, "even 
those who cannot stir from their deathbed may 
marry." And what is to be done· about lesbian 
couples, who may be able to conceive via 
artificial insemination and the like, but who still 
cannot marry? Arguably, a couple made. up of 
two women, both of whom may be fertile, equals 
double the chances of procreating. 
The State also argued that it wanted 
to ensure the optimal setting for child rearing. 
Although the Department of Public Health 
defines the optimal setting for child rearing as 
a "two parent family with one parent of each 
sex," the court aptly pointed out that even 
awful, self-centered opposite-sex couples are 
not precluded from getting married and having 
children. And, with the liberal adoption laws 
of Massachusetts, preventing same-sex couples 
from marrying makes it no more likely that 
children will be raised by two parents of the 
opposite sex. 
Finally, the State said it wanted to 
preserve scarce public and private resources. 
The court flatly rejected the assumption 
that same-sex couples were more financially 
independent, and thus less in need of public 
and private subsidies. Furthermore, how can 
you rationally include non-needy couples of the 
opposite sex, while denying non-needy couples 
that happen to be of the same sex? 
Please see Rothstein at page 6 
By D. Scott Carlton 
Special to Motions 
Redefining the word "marriage" strikes a loud 
uncomfortable chord among Americans. The 
Defense of Marriage Movement,. with its deeply 
religious roots, poses an un-engaging opponent 
to those demanding same sex marriages. To 
confront those citing dubious biblical references 
is like asking your mother why you must do a 
chore, and she harshly responds: "Because I am 
your mother, and I said so." The simple fact is, 
however, that marriage has always been defined 
as the union between a man and a woman. It 
makes sense to use the word marriage to define 
this traditional union, and to use another 
term, domestic partnership, to define a union 
between two people of the same sex. The two 
unions are apples and oranges, both fruits, but 
still not the same. 
If states are going inequitably to 
disburse benefits to these two distinctly 
different unions, more than simple semantics 
is required to justify the disbursement. The 
most rational justification for such a distinction 
is the states' desires to promote reproduction 
and the cultivation of offspring. Religions 
and cultures have · recognized this benefit 
for thousands of years. In order to continue 
the human race, a man and woman must 
engage in sexual relations. When children are 
produced, it is beneficial to rear the children 
with two parental figures, with a natural and 
inherent connection, both participating in the 
children's upbringing. The ability for same sex 
couples to undertake reproduction, through 
sexual intercourse, is naturally impossible, and 
unnaturally infrequent (i.e. adoption or artificial 
insemination) . 
The common, civil rights response to 
the traditional husband and wife marriage, 
however, is that same sex couples can both 
raise and adopt (and in some cases bear) 
children. Since same sex couples can perform 
some of the important functions associated 
with the traditional marriage, civil rights 
advocates are demanding equal treatment from 
state laws. But to make laws for the exception, 
rather than the norm, is contrary to the idea 
of adopting laws for the greater good. Perhaps 
some exceptions should be made for domestic 
partnerships that actually come closer to 
the functions of the traditional family, but 
to redefine marriage for the exception fails 
to provide a sufficient justification for a state 
to accept same sex marriages as the societal 
equivalent to traditional marriages. Domestic 
partnerships simply do not result in the 
preferred "nuclear family." · 
Compounding the argument against the 
Defense of Marriage M.ovement, however, is the 
very public and very untraditional unions of 
"man and woman." The marriages of Michael 
Jackson, Britney Spears and Liza Minnelli mock 
those who look to the government to preserve 
the sanctity of marriage. While these sham 
marriages don't speak well for those calling for 
the preservation of the traditional "holy union," 
it seems equally irresponsible for the state to 
provide incentives or subsidies to domestic 
partnerships based on the occasional and 
tasteless marriage by a handful of irresponsible 
heterosexuals. 
Along with banning gay marriages, 
states have chosen to prevent marriages 
between unions of men and women that 
are harmful to society. For example, states 
criminalize incestuous relationships and void 
incestuous marriages between relatives of 
close blood relation. Even though incestuous 
relationships are a union between a man and 
a woman, bearing children in these particular 
circumstances is likely to result in severe 
medical problems. Like same sex marriages, 
nature provides sufficient justification to deny 
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executives, lawyers, an 
investment banker, educators, 
therapists and a computer 
engineer. Many are active in 
church, community and sch ool 
groups. They have employed 
such legal means as are available 
to them - for example, joint 
adoption, powers of attorney, 
and joint ownership of real 
property - to secure aspects 
of their relation ships. Each 
plaintiff attests a desire to marry 
his or her partner in order to 
affirm publicly their commitment 
to each other and to secure the 
legal protections and ben efits 
afforded to married couples and 
their children 
Perhaps the court is going to fashion a marriage 
law based on the white-collar status of the 
marriage candidates. We can't decipher-at 
least not yet in the Chief Justice's opinion, why 
any of this history is relevant, except for one fact. 
They all have been in a "committed relationship" 
for many years. WHERE WERE THEY BEFORE 
APRIL 11, 2001? Could it possibly be that after 
George W. Bush's inauguration in January 
of 2001 it became clear that the "marriage 
penalty" was to be eliminated? It is remarkable 
that after all these years these couples were 
able to find their co-plaintiffs finally to "affirm 
publicly" their commitment to th eir respective 
partners. 
Back to the constitutionality of the 
Massachusetts statute. The law in question, 
G.L. c.207, on which the Chief Justice focuses, 
licenses the legal union of a man and woman 
as husband and wife, "and the plaintiffs do not 
argue that the term 'marriage' has ever had a 
different meaning under Massachusetts law ... 
. This definition of marriage ... derives from the 
common law .... Far from being ambiguous, 
the undefined word 'marriage' as u sed in G.L. 
c.207 confirms the [Massach usetts House's) 
intent to h ew to the common law and quotidian 
meaning concerning the genders of the 
marriage partners." Following a tour de force of 
the futility of abandonin g distinctions su ch as 
"illegitimacy" and a comparison to laws against 
interracial marriage, the court gets down to the 
constitutional business at hand. 
The department argues that no 
fundamental right or "suspect" 
class is at issue here, and rational 
basis is the appropriate standard 
of review . ... [W)e conclude that 
the marriage ban does not meet 
the rational basis test for either 
due process or equal protection. 
Because the s tatute does not 
meet the rational bas is review, 
we do not consider the plaintiffs ' 
arguments that this case m eets 
strict judicial scrutiny. 
The department posits three 
legislative rationales for 
prohibiting same-sex couples 
from marrying: ( 1) providing 
a "favorable setting for 
procreation". (2) en suring the 
optimal setting for child rearing, 
which the department defines 
as "a two parent family with 
one parent of each sex"; and 
(3) preserving scarce State and 
financial resources. We con sider 
each in turn. 
The lower court held that the "state's 
interest in regulating marriage is based 
on the traditional con cept that marriage's 
primary purpose is procreational." The Chief 
J u s tice's answer: "Th is is incorrect." Not 
"this is irrational," but "you, Massachusetts, 
are wrong about what your primary purpose 
is ." Interesting. It is incorrect , the Chief 
J u stice says, becau se the law does not privilege 
procreation above all other forms of intimacy. 
As a basis for her conclusion the Chief Justice 
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states that it only appears that the marriage 
laws regulated heterosexual intimacy b ecau se 
only heterosexuals could marry. Suggesting 
this is circular reasoning. She misses the point 
that that is precisely why the laws were passed, 
and h omosexuality was not dealt with at the 
time althou gh it existed. On this first point, the 
Chief Justice clearly prefers her reasons to that 
of the Commonwealth, and therefore declares 
the Commonwealth's reasons "irrational." 
Regarding the . second rationale, the 
Chief Justice merely states that "(r)estricting 
marriage to opposite sex couples cannot 
plausibly further the policy of protecting the 
welfare of children." The opinion does not touch 
on the word "optimal," which was the basis 
for the Commonwealth's position. Instead, 
the Chief Jµstice prefers h er conclusion, so 
the Commonwealth's conclusion must b e 
"irrational." Here the Chief Justice su ggests 
that because same sex couples may have 
dependents, including aging parents in their 
care, they are no less deserving of the economic 
benefits of marriage, although she does not 
mention why single persons with dependents 
should n ot reap the legal financial benefits of 
marriage. 
Two J u stices joined in the Chief Justice's 
opinion. A third concurred in the result, 
finding, all alone, that the Commonwealth's 
statute violated equal protection. Justice 
Greany stated "[t)hat the classification is sex 
based is self evident." He does not state which 
sex, male or female, is discriminated against, 
and instead invents a new gender: "same sex." 
Obviously this cannot be discrimination against 
an individual, and it is clear why the other three 
justice who found th e law unconstitutional 
avoided any "suspect' class analysis. 
Three justices dissented. All three joined 
in the opinions of one another. Justice Spina, 
warning of the far reaching repercussions of the 
majority's activism, wrote: 
This court has previously 
exercised the judicial restraint 
mandated by art. 30 and declined 
to extend due process protection 
to rights not traditionally 
coveted, despite recognition of 
their social importance. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court 
exercises restraint in the 
application of substantive due 
process because guideposts for 
responsible decision-making in 
this uncharted area are scarce 
and open-ended. By extending 
constitutional protection to an 
asserted right or liberty interest 
we, to a great extent, place the 
matter outside the area of public 
debate and legislative action. 
We must therefore 'exercise 
the u tmost care whenever we 
are asked to break new ground 
in this field,' lest the liberty 
protected by the Due Process 
Clause be subtly transformed 
into the policy preference of the 
Members of this Court. [internal 
quotation marks omitted] [Mr. 
Justice Spina cited to various 
cases of the Massachusetts and 
United States Supreme Courts]. 
Justice Sossman, also dissenting from 
the Chief Justice's opinion, pointed out: 
It is not, however, our 
assessment that matters. 
Conspicuously absent from the 
court's opinion today is any 
acknowledgment that attempts 
at scientific study of the 
raffi:ifications of raising children 
in same-sex couples households 
are themselves in their infancy 
and so far have produced 
inconclusive · and conflicting 
results. Notwithstanding our 
belief that gender and sexual 
orienta tion of parents should not 
m atter to the success of the child 
rearing venture, studies to date 
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reveal that there are still some 
observable differences between 
children raised by opposite sex 
couples and children raised 
by same-sex couples. . . . The 
legislature is not required to 
share that belief but may, as the 
creator of the institution of civil 
marriage, wish to see the proof 
before making a fundamental 
alteration to that institution. 
Shorn of emotion-laden 
invocations, the opinion ultimately 
opines that the Legislature 
is acting irrationally when it 
grants benefits to a proven 
successful family structure while 
denying the same benefits to a 
recent, perhaps promising, but 
essentially untested alternate 
family structure. 
J u stice Cordy, also dissenting, stated 
that courts that have found the right to marry to 
be fundamental have focused on the underlying 
interest of every individual to procreation. 
The legislature's allowing same-sex couples to 
adopt, argued Justice Cordy, is premised on the 
inability or µnwillingness of one of the biological 
parents to do so. 
The Chief Justice's opinion and the 
concurrence by Justice Greany were enou gh 
to carry the day. But the remedy ordered was 
not to require the variou s departments to issue 
marriage licenses, nor was it to strike down 
the marriage statute in toto. Instead, the court 
ordered the legislature to do an undetermined 
something within the next 180 days. 
Goodridge II 
In response to Goodridge I, the 
Massachusetts Senate considered a bill that 
would make available to same sex couples all of 
the protections, benefits, rights, responsibilities 
and legal incidents that are now available 
to opposite sex married couples, but would 
denominate the relationship thus created a 
"civil union" instead of a "civil marriage." The 
Senate su bmitted th e question to the Supreme 
Judicial Court whether such a designation 
would comply with the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth and various articles of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The same 
majority signed a new opinion by the Chief 
Justice that answered a resounding "NO;" 
In rejecting the Senate's proposal to 
confirm to same-sex couples all the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage but not the title 
"marriage," the Chief J u stice argued: 
(I)ntangible ben efits fl.ow from 
marriage . . . intangibles that 
are an important component 
of marriage as a "civil right". 
[We) stated that "[m]arriage also 
bestows enormous private and 
social advantages on those who 
choosetomarry ... [and) isatonce 
a deeply personal commitment 
to another human being and 
a highly public celebration 
of the ideals of mutuality, 
companionship, intimacy, 
fidelity and family." Because it 
fulfills yearnings for security, 
safe haven, and connection that 
express our common humanity, 
civil marriage is an esteemed 
institution, and the decision 
whether and whom to marry is 
among life's momentous acts 
of self-d efinition. Therefore, 
without the right to choose to 
marry, same-sex couples are not 
only denied full protection of the 
laws, but are "excluded from the 
full range of human experience. 
Not only is there no explanation as to how the 
compromise legislation would deny anyone 
the "full protection of the law," but this is the 
language of fundamental rights and suspect 
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classes that the court so carefully eschewed 
in Goodridge I. In dissent Justice Sossman 
wrote: 
Today's answer to the Senate's 
question discards the fig leaf 
of the rational basis test and, 
relying on the rhetoric rather 
than the purported reasoning 
of Goodridge [I], assumes that 
discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is prohibited 
by our Constitution as if sexual 
orientation were indeed a suspect 
classification. If that is the view 
of the majority of the justices, 
they should identify the new test 
they have apparently adopted for 
determining that a classification 
ranks as "suspect" - other types 
of persons making claims of a 
denial of equal protection will 
need to know whether they, 
too, can qualify as a "suspect" 
classification under that new 
test and therefore obtain strict 
scrutiny analysis of any statute, 
regulation or program that uses 
that classification. 
Nevertheless, the resounding "No" of 
the majority has forced a constitutional crisis 
and a constitutional convention. A compromise 
amendment similar to the Senate bill was 
rejected last week by liberal and conservative 
elements of the Massachusetts legislature, each 
taking an "all or nothing approach." The battle 
is set to produce an amendment prohibiting 
same-sex "marriages." Political pundits are 
predicting the amendment's passage in the 
Massachusetts legislature and, by a narrower 
margin, the people of the Commonwealth. 
Presumably the Goodrich I and II majority will 
be able to hear the legislature and the people 
when the constitutional prohibition against 
same-sex marriages is answered by a "YES." 
At least the four justices cannot prohibit the 
process. 
In the meantime, the City of. San 
Francisco is issuing marriage licenses to same-
sex persons in violatioµ of California law. 
Why these couples could not wait the average 
fourteen years the Massachusetts plaintiffs 
waited to assert their commitment is unclear, 
but then again April 15th is coming up, and 
those deductions are looking awfully good. 
*** 
[The cases are Goodridge v. Dep't of Public 
Health, SJC 08860 (Mass. Nov. 18, 2003); and 
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, SJC 
09163 (Mass. Feb. 3, 2004)) . 
*** 
(David S. Moynihan is a graduate of the College 
of the Holy Cross (as is Mr. Justice Greany) and 
the New England School of Law. He received an 
LL.M in International Law from the University 
of San Diego in 1998, and an LL.M. in Taxation 
from the same school in 2002. He is licensed to 
practice law in California, Massachusetts and 
before the United States Supreme Court). 
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The Massachusetts decision also 
seems to rest squarely within the reasoning 
of Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 
(2003). In Lawrence, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a statute criminalizing same-
sex sodomy, affirming that the "core concept 
of common human dignity, protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
precludes government intrusion into the 
deeply personal realms of consensual adult 
expressions of intimacy and one's choice of an 
intimate partner." In reaffirming the central 
role that decisions su ch as whether to marry 
or have children play in shaping one's identity, 
Lawrence suggests that statutes banning 
same-sex marriage may be unconstitutional. 
The court also plainly rejects the principle 
that fundamental rights are dependant upon 
a finding of "deeply rooted tradition," stating 
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that rights can be fundamental even if they 
were traditionally considered immoral or even 
criminal, as long as they have become "implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty." 
Whether States may use their regulatory 
authority to bar same-sex couples from civil 
marriage was a question the United States 
Supreme Court left open as a matter of federal 
law in Lawrence, where it was not an issue. 
The Massachusetts court picked up this issue 
and cited Lawrence f~>r the proposition that the 
court's obligation "is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code." According 
to the court, barring same-sex couples access 
to civil marriage arbitrarily deprives them of 
membership in one of the community's most 
rewarding and cherished institutions, an 
exclusion incompatible with the constitutional 
principles of respect for individual autonomy 
and equality under law. Citing the fact that 
same-sex couples are elsewhere afforded 
equal treatment under Massachusetts law, 
especially in the realm of parental rights, the 
court stated that the ban "works a deep and 
scarring hardship on a very real segment of the 
community for no rational reason." 
Critics of the most recent decision by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
argue that proposed Senate Bill 2175, drafted 
in response to the high court's ruling last 
November, accords same-sex couples all of 
the substantive benefits, rights and privileges 
as opposite-sex couples within a parallel civil 
union framework. As Justice Sosman points out 
in h er descent, why is it that a different mµne, a 
mere difference in form, automatically connotes 
a lesser status in violation of the Constitution? 
Exactly what is in a name? 
As the Massachusetts court points out, 
the difference between the terms "civil marriage" 
and "civil union" is far from harmless-"it is a 
considered choice of language . that reflects a 
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely 
homosexual." The denomination of the 
difference as merely a "squabble over the 
name to be used" clearly misses the point that 
separate but equal hardly ever is. Maintaining 
two separate classes of unions, according 
to the court, has the effect of "maintaining 
and fostering a stigma ·that the Constitution 
prohibits ." The word "marriage" itself then is 
one of its protections. 
Marriage is a unique relationship--
synonymous with "family." While same-sex 
couples can protect themselves in limited 
ways by creating wills, health care proxies 
and co-parent adoptions, these arrangements 
do not come close to emulating the automatic 
protections and peace of mind that marriage 
confers. Further, it is a gateway to hundreds of 
legal protections established by the state and 
over one thousand by the federal government. 
Far from undermining marriage, the 
struggle for full equality for same-sex couples 
is an acknowledgement of the important role 
marriage has in society and the power it has 
over all our lives. Same-sex couples, in seeking 
the freedom to marry, have simply asked that 
their relationships be given the same respect 
under law accorded to others. 
With the ruling, the Massachusetts 
legislature is now set to consider an amendment 
legally defining marriage as between a man and 
a woman. The ruling has also revived interest 
in a proposed federal constitutional amendment 
that would define marriage throughout the 
country as "the union of a man and a woman," 
which has been pending in Congress since May 
2003. Although both President Bush and U.S. 
Sen. John Kerry, a Massachusetts Democrat, 
oppose gay marriage, the proposed amendment 
could well become an issue in the 2004 
presidential election. 
In the meantime, one of the biggest 
questions arising from this decision is 
whether other states will have to recognize 
Massachusetts's same-sex marriages. The 
answer is presently unclear. Article IV of the 
federal constitution requires that each state 
grant "full faith and credit" to "the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings" of its sister 
states. However, a judge-made exception to 
the full-faith-and-credit requirement currently 
permits states to deny recognition to out-of-
state marriages on public policy grounds. 
, 
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States whose public policy condemns same-
sex marriage might b e able to invoke this 
exception to deny recognition to Massachusetts· 
marriages. 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
passed in 1996, specifically authorizes states to 
deny recognition to same-sex marriages of sister 
states. But the statute may not be constitutional. 
The federal constitution empowers Congress to 
prescribe the "manner" in which states accord 
full faith and credit; yet, some say that it does 
not appear to give Congress the authority to 
regulate the substance of full faith and credit. 
If the legal briefs filed in the Massachusetts 
case are any indication, it is likely that the 
DOMA could be challenged on Full Faith and 
Credit grounds (or Equal Protection Clause 
grounds) now that same:.sex marriage is legal in 
Massachusetts. 
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marital benefits to those that cannot, and those 
that should not, bear children. Yet same sex 
marriages do not substantively impact society 
as might incestuous child-bearing relationships. 
In terms of harmful effects, gay marriages do 
little but offend religious zealots. Hence, states 
banning same sex marriages may not do so on 
the basis that such relationships may result in 
potential harm to the innocent. 
In addition, the refusal of states to 
grant legal benefits to incestuous marriages 
is not formed on moral grounds. Incest laws 
generally prevent relationships between those 
of close blood relationship; they do not prevent 
relationships between close family members (i.e. 
step-brother & step-sister) . A man can marry 
a woman with a ten year-old daughter, and 
eight years later divorce his wife and marry his 
eighteen year-old step-daughter. But states take 
no action to prevent this morally questionable 
relationship. Therefore, states banning same 
sex marriages cannot base their rationale 
on moral grounds. If society is prepared to 
recognize the marriage of a step-father and step-
daughter and but not to recognize the marriage 
of two consenting adults of the same sex, then 
marriage is a baffling moral hypocrisy. The only 
rational way to justify the failure of states to 
recognize same sex marriages while recognize 
step-father - step-daughter marriages, is to 
address the fact that the former relationship 
has the natural potential of developing into a 
child-bearing family. 
Since the state's interest in subsidizing 
marriage through incentives relates more to 
developing the natural and traditional family, 
those incentives should be conferred only to 
those couples that have a reasonable potential 
of forming such families . Current marriage 
laws, however, extend marital benefits to 
s"everal categories of heterosexual relationships 
unrelated to the intended goals of the 
incentives. In fact, these relationships, enjoyed 
by h eterosexual couples, are also commonly 
found in domestic partnerships. However, states 
fail to define these traditional marriages as 
domestic partnerships, or at least fail to prevent 
subsidizing marriages that possess no rational 
relation to the state subsidizing the couple. 
So why should states continue to subsidize 
marriages that, like same sex marriages, are 
highly ·unlikely to need incentives associated 
with the nuclear family? 
Prior to the formation of any marriage 
between man and wife, it would be difficult 
appropriately to identify which particular 
young h eterosexual couples will have children 
and which will not (due to infertility, elective 
surgery, medications, and choice) . Thus, it 
would be impossible to identify which couples 
would be eligible for marital rather than 
domestic partnership benefits. Further, it is 
not irrational to presume that a high percentage 
of young heterosexual marriages develop into 
the nuclear family. True, a high percentage of 
heterosexual couples eventually develop into 
the traditional nuclear family. But when should 
marriage benefits s tart? At the beginning of 
those unions? The refusal of states to designate 
young, childless heterosexual married couples 
as domestic partners (or at least bestow or deny 
the same rights) suggests an underlying form 
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1 1 
, 
Page 7 MOTIONS March 2004 
From the Editor: Continuing our look back into the law school's past during itsfifti.eth 
anniversary year, MOTIONS reprints this issue the front page ofThe Woolsack's Novem-
ber 1969 edition, featuring the inimitable Melvin Belli, "King of Torts." 
Grant Cooper -8. ENGLEBRECHT 
Cooper Reveals Pressures In· 
Def ending. Unpopular Clients 
Grant Cooper, Sirhan Sirhan's defense attorney, spoke in More 
Hall Oct. 24, at the invitation of Phi Alpha Delta. Mr. Cooper's 
topic was, "Criminal L<lwyer - Saint or Sinner." 
Mr. Cooper opened by · . 
questioning the basic concept ~ence ~us! be dec1d~.d by an 
of our legal system - that a imp~rt1al .Jury upon careful 
man is presumed innocent consideration of all the facts, 
until proven guilty. He said not by the press, the police, the 
that with the upsurge of in- Dist~ict Att?rney, or the 
terest in criminal law due to pubhc. He also advised that 
the mass media, a defendant is there is a very real possibility 
often found guilty in·the eyes of that the opportunity of a fair 
the general public before the trial goes by the board if these 
case even comes to trial. This forces are not kept at bay. 
is especially true with a Mr. Cooper went on to 
notorious defendant, such as describe the problems 
Jack Ruby, Sirhan, Richard associated with being in the 
Speck, etc. position of defending an un-
Mr. Cooper countered that popular defend~nt. He said 
the question of guilt or inno- that when it was announced 
Tuitior:i Up 
Next Year 
Effectiv~ September 1970, 
tuition at the law school will be 
increased. The announcement 
came from Dean Sinclitico at a 
meeting of the SBA, Nov. 11. 
The Day Division rate will be 
increased from $600 to $750 per 
semester. Night school 
students will pay $500, com-
pared· to the present $450 a 
semester. The single unit rate 
will be raised to·$60. 
The Dean said the increase 
was not simply a matter of 
P.rofit and revealed that the 
school has operated with 
deficit for the past several 
years. He went on to mention· 
sever<U improvements planned 
for next yearrnention several! 
iqiprovements plannlild for. 
next year, including the hiring!· 
of several · additional
1 professors. 
The Dean said he was en-, 
couraged by the calibre of 
students enrolling the pas~ 
years and said he felt the· 
school was on its way to 
becoming an outstanding law. 
school. "But,,' he concluded,' 
"we have a way to go yet, and 
we need money to do it." .. 
that he would defend Sirhan,. 
"The reaction of the public was 
almost universally one of 
shock and indignation." 
He read a few letters from 
people attacking him for 
taking the case (See photo 
above). The letters were ex- : 
tremely abusive, their writers 
calling him everything from a 
communist to a fascist, as well 
as several unprintable names, 
simply because he had the 
courage to practice the precept 
of equal justice for all. 
The major problems of the 
defense attorney, he thought, 
are that the public feels that 
the attitudes of the defendant 
are the attitudes of his at- · 
torney, that there is a tendency 
to allow personal feelings to 
affect the willingness to fight 
for a client, and that the 
financial problems of trying to 
defend indigent clients are 
immense unless there is some 
outside support to keep the 
attorney going. 
Concluding, Mr . Cooper 
stated that the defense at-
torney has a duty to defend his 
client, regardless of his per-
sonal feelings. 
Early Posting 
of Grades OK'd 
Half forgotten in the heated 
discussion during and 
following the Student-Faculty 
Co-operation Committee 
meeting Nov. 13 were three 
interesting topics. 
Judge Kunzel 
Dies at 68 Approved wasthe proposal · ! ·that grades be posted on the 
U.S. District Judge Fred bulletin board as soon as all 
Kunzel, 68,. a 10-year grades for a separate section 
veteran of the federal or class are in. The policy has 
court bench, died of an been to withhold all such in-
ap parent heart attack formation until grades were 
Nov. 19 at his Point Loma mailed to the student after 
home. every professor in the school 
Judge Kunzel was chief bad turned in his grades. 
U.S. district judge for The subject of mandatory 
the southern district of attendance at classes is to be 
California, including San studied further to determine 
Diego and Imperial coun· precise state requiremen~ as 
ties. He was appointed to well as those of the Veterans 
the federal bench in 1959 Administration covering 
by President Eisenhower. students who qualify for VA 
benefits. 
King of Torts 
Capacity Crowd Hears Belli 
He was introduced as the King of Torts but 
he was more like the pied piper as he led his 
spellbound audience from place to place, 
sharing with them experience after 
fascinating experience along the way. 
The speaker was Melvin M. Belli, a lawyer 
who lives the law. The kind who goes to 
Stockholm to get a different view of porn-
ography and probes into a cadaver to get a 
real feel fo.r human physiology. 
At the invitation of P.A.D. law fraternity, 
Mr. Belli came to San Diego Nov. 7 to speak in 
More Hall. And speak he did. He covered 
everything from topless dancers to capital 
punishment. His main theme, however, was 
the modern-day law. He spoke of a "present 
day revolution in the law'' which is ushering in 
a "golden age" of the law, a law that "fits into 
daily living." 
High on his list for praise was the Supreme 
Court, for its part in bringing changes about. 
"The Brown case alone was enough to 
'jµstify the existence of the Warren Court," he 
said. "Whether you're from the South or the 
North or wherever. If you don' t like it or you 
do like it, you've got to recognize the social 
and historical fact that if we didn't get in-
tegration when we did, we'd have had the 
damnedest revolution in this coqntry that they 
ever had." 
Belli went on to talk about Gideon v. 
Wainwright and Escobedo v. Illinois. 
"What runs through these Supreme Court 
cases is the protection of the individual," he 
said. "That's the gravamen of the law revolt 
in the United States Supreme Court, and 
you're not getting it in the legislature. Jn the 
legislature its en masse. In the United States 
Supreme Court they don't work on causes, 
they work on individuals. 
"The layman says the Supreme Court 
wastes too much time on the drunks, the 
Gideons and people like that,'' he went on. "I 
say, as long as the Supreme Court wastes its 
time, if you will, on the least of us, then the 
majority of us are protected." 
All is not yet perfect, however. Belli called 
the Grand Jury system outmoded, observing 
that when a man is indicted and later 
acquitted, people tend to refer to him as the 
man who was indicted. Mr. Belli would toss 
--Hi. OOFFLEMYRE 
the coroner's inquist onto the same garbage 
heap, saying it worked well in the days of 
Henry VIII but that most of the states had 
progressed beyond that period. 
Mr. Belli spoke of corpus juris - the "whole 
body of the law," and said "if you have 
something festering in one spot its going to 
affect the entire corpus.'' What he was getting 
at was the topless controversy. "The same 
law that applies to obscenity and pornography 
cases is the law that applies to your right to go 
to church and the right to hold property," he 
maintained. 
" If you have arbitrary law in obscenity or 
topless, you set the stage for some arbitrary 
law in· the right of minority religions to 
worship," he continued. 
Mr. Belli said that in his defense of a recent 
topless case he had come head to head with 
-8. ENGLEBRECHT 
the California Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Board. "The ABC has a plenary grant of 
power. In everything to do with liquor they 
shall determine if its good for the health and 
welfare of the people," he said, adding that 
within this power the commissioner can ar-
bitrarily determine what go~s on, in there, 
including what color wallpaper, what kind of 
lights, what type of entertainment and the 
like. 
"That amounts to censorship," he warned, · 
saying the same rule of law that applies to 
freedom of speech applies to topless. 
An hour after it had begun the world-wind 
tour ended, leaving many a law student with 
stars in his eyes. The more practical vQiced a. 
different view: Can you imagine having to 
face that man in court? 
.~x;¥i;~{~t(¢r:.1t~e_· .:z ,,,, s ·~ ~ , ..,u , u m:~w?:.:;:~·:-.. 
In the next few weeks students wiliface a special 
" SBA election to vote on proposed changes to the 
SBA By-laws. On page 2, these proposed changes 
wta,~ printed, as well as an editorial li.'tating the 
,, . Wo-Oisack's position in the matter. Also on that 
0 page, SBA President, Sam Alhadeff gives his 
views on the subject. 1 
Also inside ... on page 5 we are printing the first 
semester exam schedule, along with a special 
feature aimed at the beginning law student facing 
.his Jim exams. 
Inside 
President's Report ••• 2 
Editorial ............ 2 
l,aw WivH ••••••••• 3 
Oraft Seminar ••••• 4 
BALSA : •••••••• • 4 
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THE 2004 
MCLENNON MOOT COURT 
COMPETITION: 
FINAL ROUND 
Photo by Pablo Mason 
Pictured from left to right: Judge Michael Hawkins of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme 
Court; and Justice Judith Haller of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District. 
Photo by Pablo Mason 
"What an amazing honor-to argue 
before a justice of the Supreme Court 
and other distinguished judges. This 
is the opportunity of a lifetime." 
Finalis t and Winner of the 2004 Moot 
Court Competition, J essica Heldman 
"I remember well over a year now 
Dean Rodriguez indicating to me 
that the USD law students deserve 
a prestigious internal moot court 
competition. The Dean explained in_ 
detail his vision of this competition 
and has continually provided hi~ 
time, energy, wisdom, and financial 
support so that his idea could become 
a reality. Having now finished the 
third year of this very successful 
competition, I am confident in saying 
that the tradition Dean Rodriguez 
has started will not end. This is 
especially true given the dedication 
and hard work of the USD Moot Court 
Board. On behalf of the faculty, I also 
wish to congratulate each and every 
one of the advocates. Let me sum up 
with a few words that come to mind 
regarding the students that competed 
in the McLennan competition: 
intelligent, confident, poised, and 
most definitely fearless. You are 
an amazing group of lawyers and I 
am proud and honored to have been 
your teacher." 
---Professor Michael Devitt 
I 
THE CASE 
ACLA v. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/ 
Willamette, Inc. 
The case presented three issues: · 
1. Whether two anti-abortion posters-pro-
duced by Petitioner constitute a true threat or 
I:Jrotected First Amendment speech; 
2 . Whether the materials posted on the 
Petitioner's website constitute a true threat or 
protected First Amendment speech; 
3 . Whether de nova review is the correct 
appellate standard. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: 
"It was a close question and the 
court wa~ divided, but someone has 
to win and someone has to lose. It's 
not much different from what you 
would see in an appellate court. 
The questioning is just as annoy-
ing - it's the judges' opportunity 
to probe for weakness. I think they 
did a very good job, and I congratu-
late both counsel and the team that 
picked the case." 
(George Decker, "Scalia puts USD law students 
to the supreme test," San Diego Daily Tran-
script, Feb. 18, 2004, at 3A). 
Photo by Pablo Mason 
''Arguing in the final round before 
SU.ch a distinguished panel of jurists, 
including Justice Scalia, was an 
unparalleled thrill and a delight." 
Finalist and Runner-Up of the 2004 Moot 
Court Competition, Maura Hartmere 
~ 
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Join the WOMEN'S LAW CAUCUS 
Tuesday, March-23d at 4PM in the Writs 
for the 
ANNUAL FACULTY AUCTION 
Cham.pagne, Beer, Hors D'Oeuvres & Door Prizes 
Proceeds to Benefit Becky's House and 
The Loan Repaym.ent Assistance P~ograDl 
_.>.. 
Faculty donations in the past have included: 1 -.l 
* Dinner with Dean Rodriguez for 10 -
* Wine tasting for 8 with Professor Allen Snyder 
* Happy Hour with Jocelyn, Pat and Verna from the Records Office 
* Tailgating & Padres Game with Lawyering Skills Faculty 




Dinner & Drinks with Professors Devitt & Claus 
$500 off BarBri 
& Many More! 
U~D LAW STUDENTS, FACULTY AND STAFF: 
WIN PRIZES! 
THE LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER WANTS TO 
HEAR FROM YOU! 
When you participate in the LRC's user survey 
LibQUAL+ 
you are entered to win a prize! 
Navigate to http:/ /survey.libqual.org/index.cfm?ID=753633 
GRAND PRIZE: PDA 
OTHER PRIZES: 
FIVE $50 CASH PRIZES 
(one entry per person) 
To en sure the confidentiality of your comments, surveys go directly to LibQual+ and will be aggregated without n ames for 
the LRC. E-mail addresses are separately registered for random electronic selection of prize winners. 
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WHY HAS OUR CULTURE 
BECOME SO COARSENED? 
By Frank Morriss 
Special to Motion s 
Anyone whose mem ory goes back four 
or five decades knows over the past ten years 
or so there has been a coarsening of America, 
a descent into .Public vulgarity, indecen cy, and 
a demeaning of h uman dignity, as if culture 
itself were the waiting room of a brothel. Our 
children u se words su itable for a saloon in a 
red-ligh t distr ict . Even respectable figures find 
language acceptable that once marked the user 
as common . Comedians present to gen eral 
h ome au diences toilet humor and worse. Girls 
from normal families 
replaced by an extreme libertarianism that 
pu ts the individual not merely beyond, but 
alon e and outside all others. The isolated man 
acts withou t a sense of social duty, without 
sen s itivity to others' feelings, with no regard for 
others' r eaction. Indeed, shock brought on by 
su ch insen s itivity gives to the isolated man a 
sen se of superiority to others. It has b ecome a 
sign of being "cool" to speak and act with regard 
only for self. 
Partly responsible for this isolationism 
is the academ ic acceptance of Darwinism as 
an explanation for the appearance of man on 
dress as if th ey were 
auditioning to be 
streetwalkers. 
None of 
this can be denied, 
though some find it 
apparently progress 
toward liberation , 
whereas it is like the 
stagnant pond that 
the poet crossed led 
by his Muse to visit 
Hell, and seeing a 
A scientt}1c wor 
needs no culture; i 
needs only technique, 
and the application o 
induction, rather tha 
deduction. It ''feels" it 
way to achievement. 
earth, an offshoot or "sport" 
in the evolution of brutes from 
amoebae, and from brutes to 
"rational animals." There was 
no place in this "descent of 
man" for his being "a little less 
than an angel," since modern 
man does not believe in angels, 
th at is modern "educated" 
man. With the discard of 
angels, man inevitably 
became just a little more than 
a brute. It was inevitable that 
man filled with mud rise before the b oat , asked , 
"Who are you who h ave become so foul?" (Ma 
tu chi se?, che sei si fatto brutto? La Divina 
Commedia, transla ted by Louis Biancolli) . 
All this s h ould be con sidered as to its 
causes and its con sequences, before it is too 
late. The coarsening of cultu re has preceded the 
fall of empires more than once in history. When 
animal instincts of man ch allenge h is intellect 
and spiritual qualities, his appetite can replace 
the qualities of selflessness necessary for the 
dedication that sacrifices self for the common 
good . Victory at arms n eeds a certain purity of 
heart as much as it need s s kill. Disciplin e fails 
wh en indulgence replaces it. The vocation to 
put oth ers ahead of self serves n ation s as well 
as God, and at th e h eart of America's descent 
toward "th e sands of h orror" ( orribil sabbione) 
is a sort of isolation of the individual in the few 
years given us humans to live. 
How has this isolation taken place? 
For one, by the pu tting aside of thou ght 
and replacing it with feeling, that is, with 
"experience." It is considered today that we 
know best, or even only, by experience. That is 
the essence of existentialism. Bu t that ignores 
that such is possible only for the individual, 
who cannot feel or experience wh at any other 
of h is fellow humans do. To do that requires 
knowledge of that which on e shares with all 
other humans, "human nature." Pascal said 
this better when he wrote (Pensees) of "the 
extraordinary blindness" th at is living "withou t 
investigating what we are." He commented 
long ago on what is today th e human situation: 
"True ·nature being lost, everything becomes 
its own nature; as the true good being lost, 
everything becomes its own true good." 
In this state of things the individual 
sees whatever he chooses to do or say as his 
"right" and therefore good , without reference 
to its effect on others. He does it "his way," 
and is con sidered a hero in doing so, even if in 
the doing it h e does and communicates more 
in the mann er of a brute, than a man. Again 
Pascal: "Man does not know in what rank to 
place himself. He has plainly gone astray, and 
fallen from his true place." The consequences 
of abandoning ontology and the knowledge of 
Christian faith served by the science of being 
h as now caught up with post-Reformation 
culture . The individual is isolated in self anEl. 
consequ ently acts, speaks and "experiences" 
without regard for consequences brought upon 
others, with disdain for any "common good." 
Respect for any ethics that stressed 
duty as the con comitant of "right" h as nearly 
disappeared. The conservatism that follows 
from scholastic · ontology's insistence on 
the importance of human nature has been 
Darwin's Man would b ecome 
the d isgusting Yahoo of Guliver's Travels. 
_With acceptance of men as m erely "n aked 
a pes," h istory became of little importance. And 
with contempt for history, man must be simply 
isolated in the present. Since with evolution the 
past was less perfect than the present, then 
nothing of the past could be a model or lesson 
for th e present. That is why the study of history 
has been set aside. It now has nothing to say to 
those who come after it. The idea of the past as 
prologue is incomprehensible to those of today's 
generation , told as they are that past times were 
an example of the need to escape to a future 
utopia. ,. 
A scien tific world needs no culture; it 
n eeds only techn ique, and the application of 
indu ction, rather than deduction. It "feels" 
its way to achievement. It ignores that th e. 
importance of man walking on the moon or 
Mars is only in that it is being done by Man-
that is, what is doing the walking, not on the 
what of the moon or Mars. We could drop off 
a whole men agerie of brutes on the farthest 
planet there is from earth , and it would be 
of absolutely no importance at all other than 
what Man migh t learn about himself from the 
doing of it. Scientific accomplishment is n eu tral 
regarding culture or human dignity. 
Another cause of the coarsening of 
m odern culture is the feminist movement that 
has insisted that having equal rights m eans 
accepting women's doing everything men 
are allowed to do. The insistence was that t o 
have equ al rights women should be accepted 
as no different from men. Thus acceptance of 
a certain coarseness thought to accompany 
maleness, whether with any basis or not, 
became acceptance of the same regarding 
women. When women became troopers, it was 
inevitable they would soon be swearing like 
troopers. If men have historically been tolerated 
in acting out lust, it became certain that women 
would be more inclined to offer themselves for 
such practice. And male reaction to sexual 
desire would soon be considered to be identical 
to that of women. Nakedness, undress on the 
part of women, was carried to an extreme far 
beyond prudent modesty with the excu se that 
men and women were the same in matters of 
sex, when it is qu'ite obvious they are not. 
Flirtation, long con sidered proper 
by women in courts hip , degenerated first 
to titillation and then to sexual enticement. 
Signs that once said to a man the woman was 
available for marriage have come to mean "no 
need to wait for marriage," though the woman 
might have no intention the sign be taken 
seriously- a dangerou s naivete. 
All of this has dem eaned con siderably 
the gen u in e purpose of sex, for procreation in 
the environment of marriage necessary to create 
the stable family. Today sex is publicly flaunted 
as a toy, nothing private or precious. It is the 
matter of low comedy, to be laughed at and 
put on a plane with bodily functions that serve 
m an's animality, whereas sex is meant to serve 
h is capacity to love, rather than to lust. Women 
are encouraged to think of themselves as the 
object of that lust, rather than of love. Dante 
wrote about that, too, in his Inferno, when 
describing the fate in Hell of Th ais, a prostitute 
who u sed her beau ty to bring abou t the burning 
of n ation s' greatness . It is a lesson ab out the 
destructiven ess of lust, which can overpower 
the greatest and destroy civilizations as easily 
as it does the intellects and wills of men. 
There "is a type of isolation that is shown 
by the capture of modern interest by the present 
and the prurient, shown in illiteracy about not 
simply history, but about the nobility and 
courage of the past in the pilgrimage of man 
from his beginning toward his intended goal. 
Television h as proved to be an instrument 
of the trivial. Few of its offerings transcend 
entertainment and diversion. A popular fad of 
"reality TV" shows men and women embracing 
a sort of barbarism and battling for survival. Of 
course, it is staged and scripted. Even as fiction 
it is prim itive compared to the literature of past 
geniuses, which for the most part treated the 
m oral and spiritual struggle of humans against 
evil. Such writing today finds difficulty in getting 
pu blished, and usually earns small, if any profit 
for writers of publishing houses. 
Part of "reality TV's" success is its 
frankness abou t the formerly private aspect 
of living. So, too, with the invasive cameras 
that sh ow people carrying out "private" needs 
involving various degrees of nudity. Th~re 
certainly was earthiness to some-even much-
that Shakespeare wrote. Bu t never in its use 
was the true dignity of man insulted; rather, 
su ch dignity was enhanced by its contrast 
with the cheap and vulgar. The good folk of 
Shakespeare's art were always superior of 
soul, n oble in will and ch oice, "genteel" in the 
genu ine meaning of that word, that is, having 
virtues associated with a true superiority-self-
respect, deference, courage, fulfillment of duty. 
Now, entertainment has become a display of 
emotions, of animal capability, of instincts for 
survival put to cunning u se. 
Barbarians were once the unci.vilized, 
ignorant of art and crude of language. The 
Catholic Church was the main influence that 
civilized the barbarians, "gentled" them into 
gentility. That was fortunate for most of u s . 
America was created by descendants of the 
former barbarians. Their present descendants-
that is, ou r children, grandchildren, great-great 
grandchild ren- are in grave danger of being de-
civilized, and again made barbarous. A major 
help in this process has been America's divorce 
not simply from any established Church, but 
from religion itself. The idea has grown greatly, 
starting in the 20th century, that almost all 
values are superior to religious ones. 
With that h as come the idea of self-
sufficient Man. But the truly educated man, 
he of wisdom and philosophy, of ethics and 
honesty, recognizes above all his dependence 
on a Superior Being from whom he received 
immaterial gifts, the greatest being the capacity 
to love unselfishly and generously. 
Do not be surprised if th at aspect of 
humanness, is discarded under pressures to 
consider Man self-sufficient . Do not be surprised 
if a barbarian state of tyranny becomes again 
admired, as it was when exercised by modern 
and older despots. If today's coarseness has 
reached our soul, we h ave a fatal condition. 
(Mr. Morriss is Executive Editor of The 
Wanderer, in which publication this article first 
appeared). (Reprinted with permission). 
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Carlton, 
continued from page 6 
of discrimination embodied in the Defense of 
Marriage Movement. 
Examination of some state incest laws 
provide further evidence of states' failure 
appropriately to define marriage in light of the 
benefits conferred. In some states first blood 
cousins can marry, in other states first cousins 
are not permitted to marry, and in states such 
as Utah, Arizona and Indiana, first cousins are 
permitted to marry if the couple is of a certain 
age (generally between fifty-five and sixty-
five) or sterile or both. In Utah for example, 
state incentives provided through recognizing 
marriage for cousins is strictly based on the 
determination that the couple cannot have 
a natural family. Therefore, cousins, who 
undergo a vasectomy or are too old to conceive 
children cannot be rationally distinguished 
from a domestic partnership relationship. The 
probability of either group raising children 
appears to be the same. Moreover, these blood 
relationships, prohibited for their harmful 
consequences, are accepted once those harmful 
consequences are eliminated. This brings back 
into question the rationale of state marriage 
benefits. Is the purpose of marital status benefits 
to promote general stability in companionship, 
or to foster an environment to provide for the 
nuclear family? If the former prevails, then 
same sex marriages should receive the same 
recognition as traditional · marriages. If the 
latter prevails, then Utah's recognition of sterile 
marriages contains no justifiable basis. 
The analysis of state incest laws leads 
to another significant and easily recognizable 
class of citizens who should be classified as 
domestic partners (or .be denied the rights of 
marital status) - elderly couples married after 
the age of sixty-fore. At a certain age, elderly 
citizens become incapable of reproducing. As 
suggested by incest laws, it is statistically 
inconceivable for a woman to reproduce at the 
age of sixty-five. Hence, it is improbable that 
the traditional marriage can come to fruition 
(and even less likely through adoption). So 
why should states provide marital benefits 
supposedly aimed at the promotion of . the 
traditional family? States cannot bestow 
marital benefits on promoting companionship 
between two people, for that would look eerily 
similar to same sex relationships. If nature 
plays a part in the definition of an appropriate 
marriage, as demonstrated by the inability of 
homosexuals to reproduce, or the ill effects 
of incestuous relationships, then how can a 
state justify providing benefits to the elderly 
or older incestuous companions, whom society 
acknowledges to be incapable of conceiving 
children? But let's see the traditionalists 
convince the American Association of Retired 
Persons that the elderly who marry are just 
domestic partners . 
As long as Americans are so concerned 
with protecting the sanctity of marriage, they 
should also focus their efforts on preventing 
those who are not old enough to graduate 
from high school, or haven't lived long enough 
to die in a war, from joining in a "sacred 
union" - a union so important that society 
feels compelled not to appease a de minimis 
number of same sex couples. Surely "sanctity 
of marriage" partisans see the absurdity of 
the notion that young boys and girls can fully 
comprehend a lifelong commitment they are 
allowed to make before these same children 
are allowed to vote president, let alone drive a 
car. Ironically, California's laws appear to put 
more requirements on those acquiring dome.stic 
partnership status than those applying for a 
marriage license. Domestic partners must be 
at least eighteen years of age, but heterosexual 
couples need not be. Perhaps Californians think 
it is just a phase for youthful homosexuals, and _ 
they will grow out of it. Yet a similar state age 
requirement for the traditional marriage (or 
better yet a constitutional ·amendment) seems 
appropriate. 
In order to justify subsiding marriage 
to protect the traditional family, states must 
do so on a consistent basis. As long as 
distinguishing rights from homosexual unions 
and heterosexual unions rests on the nuclear 
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family, those who have a realistic potential 
of having a family should be classified as 
married, and those who have no potential . 
should be domestic partners. Otherwise, a 
state's failure to recognize same sex marriages 
reeks of discrimination, justified by the 
"moral" condemnation of homosexuality. 
Unfortunately, the inability of 
Americans to separate church and state has· 
allowed the traditional definition of"marriage" 
to determine legal rights. Legal rights, 
however, should rest on rational application, 
not just tradition. The irony is that generally 
all traditional religions don't recognize 
gay marriage, but no traditional religion 
recognizes heterosexual marriages outside 
their · particular church. Accordingly, those 
married outside of our own particular religion 
should not be considered married. However, 
somehow Americans manage to compromise 
these traditional notions when forming laws 
to promote a better society. As we have done 
for hundreds of years, ·Americans must 
again compromise tradition to preserve the 
purpose of government intervention. If this 
is an uncompromising area for Americans, 
America is better off taking marriage, and 
any connotation of it, out of our laws and 
putting it back where it traditionally belongs 
- our churches. 
(Mr. Carlton is a second~year law student at 
USD). 
Madam Grammar, 
continued from page 15. 
query made in good faith. Would you please 
explain the difference between a gerund and 
a participle? 
- Timid not Truculent 
DearTimid not Truculent, 
Gladly shall I accede. An English 
gerund is formed by adding the suffix "ing" to 
the root form of a verb. The gerund functions 
both as a verb and as a noqn. For example, 
the gerund of walk is walking, and may be 
used thus: "My walking after tea gives me 
indigestion." Note that the gerund refers 
to the process of walking as an act and as 
a thing. Now, a present participle is also 
formed by a dding "ing" to the verb's root. 
Accordingly, the present participle of walk is 
walking, which is facially indistinguishable 
from the gerund. The present participle 
differs from the gerund, however, in that 
the participle functions as a verb and as 
an adjective. For example, "Walking to the 
haberdasher's, I came across several old 
school chums." Here the participle walking 
both identifies an act and describes the actor 
in the sentence's main clause (as part of a 
participial phrase). 
Dear Madam Grammar, 
What is your opinion of British spelling 
. appearing in American publications? 
- Aspiring Anglophile 
Dear Aspiring Anglophile, 
You raise a question of some concern and 
delicacy among grammarians on both sides 
of the Pond. As you well know, spelling i.n the 
English language did not become regularized 
to any degree of satisfaction until well into 
the nineteenth century. Prior to that time, 
it would have been difficult to- say, "This is 
the American (or colonial) spelling, but that 
is the English spelling," simply because n o 
regional idiosyncrasies had yet emerged. But 
nowadays certainly there are divergences: 
any of the Latin derivations ending in "or" for 
_the Americans and "our" for the Brits; an "s" 
to replace a "c" as in "defense" (American) and 
"defence" (British); a single "r' or double "lr' as 
in "willful" (American) and "wilful" (British). 
Who has the better of it? I would say 
for the mere sake of simplicity and brevity 
that the Americans generally have the better 
forms: they can write "labor" in six rather 
than seven letters and they take the word 
verbatim from Latin. They perhaps also score 
for phonetics: their "civilization" sounds 
closer to the spoken word than the British 
"civilisation" (although anyone · who has 
ever had the great good fortune of hearing 







"The Woolsack is indebted to Professor Robert 
Simmons, a candidate for the law school poet 
laureate award, for his submission of the verse 
printed below. Professor Simmons reports that 
these selections were prepared in connection 
with a trial techniques course." 
-February 1973. 
Jury Selection 
An unctuous lawyer named Quick 
Began his voir dire very slick. 
He smiled, syruped and fawned 
Till a male juror yawned 
And allowed it was making him sick. 
A loquacious young lawyer named Blabberskit, 
Began his voir dire and just wouldn't quit. 
When he finally forbore 
The jurors all swore 
That they now had a bias and shouldn't sit. 
Opening Statement 
A prattling lawyer named !'ranee 
Leaves nothing whatever to chance. 
He spews facts and law 
With a piston-like jaw 
Putting everyone into a trance. 
A p edantic young lawyer named Fission 
Reads each word of his five-page petition. 
He misses his aim 
By burying his claim; 
But he's proud of his vast erudition. 
Plaintiff's Case 
A languorous lawyer named Short 
Would.Q.'t dream of p·reparing for court. 
His questions at trial 
All miss by a mile. 
He's in contract-the case is in tort. 
An eloquent lawyer named Gruitec,l 
Is superb at summation, 'tis bruited . 
It's a shame that he's lax 
At gathering facts, 
For his client is always non-suited. 
Defendant's Case 
A belligerent lawyer named Bendix 
Bullies, brow-beats and plaintiff-pricks. 
His passionate furors 
Delight the insurers 
Till they learn the size of the verdicts. 
A contract lawyer named Perry Fling 
Will never admit to anything. 
In his fight over trifles 
.He usually stifles 
Any hope of his client in winning. 
Closing Arguments 
A vehement lawyer named Benadeux 
Declares to the jury what they must do. 
His insistent demands 
Are persuasive commands 
To the client, his wife and Benedeux. 
A forgetful lawyer named Fairly 
Never quotes the evidence squarely. 
His errors so wide 
Always favor his side. 
But the jury favors him rarely. 
cease giving thanks to the Almighty for British 
pronunciation). But then one can come right 
back with "fulfil" (British) and save a consonant 
to the Americans' "fulfill." Perhaps we would 
do well to cite the Anglo-American special 
relationship and call it a tie. But as for your 
specific question, viz. the practice of British 
spellings popping up in American printed 
matter, I think the practice to be lamentable. 
The Americans have a beautiful if provincial 









By Jonathan Meislin 
Staff Writer 
On January 13, 2004, in fllinois v. 
Lindster, the United States Supreme Court 
clarified a controversial point of law when it 
held that brief police roadblocks for the purpose 
of questioning motorists for informational 
reasons do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
This decision comes after the Supreme Court 
ruled in Indianapolis v. Edmond (531 U.S. 32 
(2000)) that police roadblocks for the purpose 
of finding evidence of drugs violate a motorist's 
Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Stephen 
Breyer, writing for the majority in Lindster, 
distinguished police road stops for questioning 
from police road stops used to search for 
drugs by noting that when an officer stops 
a motorist for questioning, the officer is not 
trying to ascertain whether or not the motorist 
has committed a crime, but rather whether the 
motorist has any information that can assist 
the police in apprehending other criminals. 
Lindster concerned a drunken motorist 
who was arrested after he was stopped at a 
police roadblock. The roadblock was set up 
to question motorists about a hit-and-run that 
had occurred a week earlier in which a seventy 
year-old bicyclist was killed. The police set up 
the roadblock at the same location and time 
of day as the hit-and-run. The police were 
stopping motorists to ascertain if they had 
any information about the hit-and-run, and to 
hand out flyers with contact information. The 
defendant Lindster pulled up to the roadblock, 
nearly hit an officer, and immediately was 
given a sobriety test due in part to the smell 
of alcohol on his breath. At trial Lindster cited 
Edmond and claimed that the road stop was an 
unconstitutional invasion of his privacy. The 
Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Lindster. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that informational road stops are not 
a violation of a motorist's Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
Justice Breyer began his opinion for 
the majority by distinguishing between the 
purpose of stopping motqrists for questioning 
and the purpose of stopping motorists under 
the suspicion that any given motorist has 
committed a crime, which latter practice was 
held unconstitutional in Edmond. In that case 
a search of an individual's car by an officer's 
general inspection (which entailed the shining 
of a flashlight into the "plain view" area of the 
car and the use of a drug sniffing dog) was held 
to be an intrusion into a motorist's right to 
privacy. In Lindster Justice Breyer argued that 
the stop in question was nothing more than an 
inquisition for information, not a stop based 
on generalized suspicion, and therefore not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Stops not 
based on generalized suspicion, argued Breyer, 
are less likely to be intrusive or to provoke 
anxiety. These factors, in combination with the 
fact that the stops are brief and are not intended 
to elicit incriminating information, confirm the 
Court's conclusion that the stops do not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The opinion did not come without some 
criticism. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his 
partial concurring opinion, wrote, "There is 
a valid and important distinction between 
seizing a person to determine whether she 
has committed a crime and seizing a person 
to ask whether she has any information about 
an unknown person who committed a crime 
a week earlier." Justice Stevens , ·along with 
two other justices, were of the opinion that the 
facts did not show whether the road block was 
tailored enough to the specific task at hand. 
Stevens cautioned that the determination of 
whether alternative and less obtrusive methods 
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are available is a question for the trial court, 
and that the proper procedure would be to 
remand the case to the state courts for further 
inquiry. For if police are able to have free reign 
to set up roadblocks any time there is a "need" 
for information, motorists may become trapped 
in unconstitutional situations. 
CAN LOTTERY WINNINGS 
EVER BE CAPITAL GAINS? 
UNLIKELY, SAYS NINTH 
CIRCUIT 
By Damien Schiff 
Editor 
In a case of first impression, a panel of 
·the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether 
the right to annuity payments derived from state 
lottery winnings, when transferred for valuable 
consideration to a third party, is entitled to 
treatment as capital gain under the Internal 
Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. (I.RC.)§ 1222). 
Plaintiff and spouse, an Oregon couple, 
won a $9 million jackpot in the state lottery 
in 1991. Plaintiff elected to take the winnings 
in annual installments of $450,000. In 1995 
th'e Oregon state legislature authorized lottery 
annuitants to alien their lottery annuity. The 
following year Plaintiff transferred to Woodbridge 
Financial Corporation his right to the remaining 
fifteen annuity payments in exchange for nearly 
$4 million. 
On his 1996 tax return Plaintiff 
reco.rded the $4 million as ordinary income. In 
1998 Plaintiff petitioned the IRS for a partial 
refund of his 1996 taxes, arguing that the $4 
million received in exchange for his annuity 
right should have been characterized as capital 
gain and therefore taxed at a lower rate. The 
IRS agreed and refunded with interest some 
$300,000. But in March 2001 the IRS sued 
Plaintiff for the refunded taxes, argui:p.g that 
the $4 million should have been classified as 
ordinary income not capital gain. 
On summary judgment the district 
court for the District of Oregon found for the 
government, concluding that "capital gains 
treatment is not appropriate here because no 
asset appreciated." Plaintiff appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. 
In an opinion written by Judge Raymond 
Fisher, the Court noted that it was the first 
to address the issue whether "the sale of a 
lottery right is a long-term capital gain." The 
Court highlighted the balancing task before 
it: ensuring on the one hand that taxpayers 
can avoid the unfairness of being taxed all at 
once for the multi-year appreciation of a capital 
asset, and preventing shrewd but unscrupulous 
taxpayers from craftily classifying all their 
income as the transfer of rights to a future 
stream of income. 
To make that balancing task easier, the 
Supreme Court has established the "substitute 
for ordinary income" doctrine. That doctrine 
requires that the courts narrowly construe 
"capital asset" to preclude taxpayers from 
converting ordinary income into pseudo-capital 
gains. Any lump sum received in lieu of what 
would be received in the future as ordinary 
income is treated as ordinary income. Owing 
to the absence of Congressional guidance, the 
doctrine operates on a case-by-case basis. 
Applying the "substitute for ordinary 
income" principle to the Plaintiffs lottery 
transfer, the Court had no difficulty in finding 
the $4 million to be ordinary income, for two 
main reasons. One, Plaintiff "did not make any 
underlying investment of capital in return for 
the receipt of his lottery right." Two, the "sale 
of his right did not reflect an accretion in value 
over cost to any underlying asset" that Plaintiff 
held. 
Plaintiffs purchase of the winning 
lottery ticket cannot itself be considered an 
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"investment" for capital gain purposes, stated 
the Court, because the Internal Revenue Code 
deems all gambling winnings to be ordinary 
income. (I.RC.§ 165(d)). Since Plaintiff by state 
law was able legally to alien his lottery interest 
only after he had won the lottery, and because 
Plaintiff had made no capital investment before 
winning the lottery, his right to the lottery 
proceeds could not be characterized as capital 
gain. 
Additionally the Court concluded that, 
because Plaintiff incurred no cost to receive the 
right to alien his lottery annuity payments, the 
value paid by Woodbridge to Plaintiff could not 
be considered capital appreciation. Although 
Plaintiff received value, it did not compensate 
Plaintiff for an increase in value over cost for 
the annuity "asset." Rather, the $4 million was 
intended to be the rough equivalent of what 
Plaintiff earned by gambling on the Oregon 
lottery in 1991 . The reward for that labor - the 
lottery funds - was ordinary income, and its 
conversion to an alienable annuity did not 
change its classification for tax purposes. 
As an aside, the Court also noted that 
its approval of Plaintiffs characterization would 
create a "dichotomous system" in which lottery 
winners who elected to take their winnings as 
an annuity would receive favored tax treatment 
over those winners who would take their 
winnings as a lump sum. 
Plaintiff, anticipating a brutal assault 
with the "substitute for ordinary income" 
doctrine, tried to parry with three arguments. 
(1) The doctrine had been tacitly overruled 
by the Supreme Court. (2) The doctrine is 
inapplicable where the taxpayer retains no 
interest in the capital asset. (2) The lottery right 
is a debt instrument under I.RC. § 1275. 
Answering Plaintiffs first argument, the 
Court distinguished the "offending" precedent, 
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, construing that 
case as concerning only the "business motive" 
element of the capital asset definition and not 
the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine. 
Addressing Plaintiffs second point, the Court 
refused to hold the doctrine inapplicable to 
all transactions where the taxpayer no longer 
retains any interest in the capital asset. Instead 
the Court found that Plaintiffs transfer of his 
entire lottery ·right was not sufficient in itself to 
exempt the transaction from the doctrine. And 
as for Plaintiffs argument that the lottery right 
was a debt instrument, the Court concluded 
that Plaintiffs lottery right was based upon 
the state's gift not the "use or forbearance of 
money." 
The Court did not address the 
government's contention that, even if the 
$4 million had been classifiable as capital 
gain, Plaintiff would have been judicially 
estopped from so alleging, because he had 
argued the opposite position in state court tax 
proceedings. 
The case is United States v. Maginnis, 
No. 02-35664 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2004). 
PORTIONS OF 
PATRIOT ACT HELD 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
By Damien Schiff 
Editor 
A United States District Court has ruled 
that part of the USA Patriot Act is unenforceable 
because unconstitutionally vague. In an 
opinion dated January 22, Judge Audrey B. 
Collins of the Central District of California in 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft [HLP) 
enjoined the federal government from enforcing 
against the named Plaintiffs section 805(a)(2)(B) 
of the Patriot Act, which provision ostensibly 
proscribes the lending of "expert advice or 
assistance" to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations. 
Please see Patriot Act at page 13 ......... 
Page 13 
Patriot Act, from page 12 
· The HLP Plaintiffs were connected in 
varying degrees with the Partiya Karkeran 
Kurdistan (PKK), a political organization that 
seeks self-determination for Kurds in Turkey, 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a political organization that seeks self-
determination for the Tamils of Sri Lanka. In 
1997 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
pursuant to authority granted by the Anti-
Terrotj.sm and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), designated the PKK and LTTE as 
"foreign terrorist organizations." 
In a prior case, Plaintiffs obtained an 
injunction against the enforcement of section 
805(a)(2)(B)'s s tatutory predecessor, found 
in AEDPA. That version prohibited giving 
"training" and "personnel" to foreign terrorist 
organizations. Judge Collins granted Plaintiffs' 
injunction in the first suit, holding that the 
AEDPA provision was unconstitutionally vague. 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed that 
decision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs brought the 
instant action to contest the Patriot Act's 
addition of "expert advice or assistance" to the 
old AEDPA provision. 
Plaintiffs principally argued that the 
s tatutory phrase "expert advice or assistance" 
was impermissibly vague and thus violated 
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clau se. 
Plaintiffs also argued that the statute could 
be construed to trench upon First Amendment 
liberties, such as speech, petition and 
association. 
Responding to these contentions, the HLP 
court began its analysis by noting three reasons 
why a statute might be unconstitutionally 
vague. (1) A statute would be void for 
vagueness if a reasonably intelligent person 
could not anticipate whicfu. activities the statute 
prohibited. (2) A statute might also violate the 
con s titutional vagueness rule if it permitted 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. (3) 
Lastly, a statute that created a chilling effect on 
the exercise of First Amendment liberties would 
be constitutionally infirm. And as for criminal 
statutes generally, a court would b e compelled 
to overturn -a law that failed to give fair notice 
th at particular conduct was sanctionable. 
Plaintiffs argued that the words "expert," 
"advice" and "assistance" as used in the Patriot 
Act fail to identify the type of conduct prohibited, 
and are indistinguishable in m eaning from the 
words "training" and "personnel," which Judge 
Collins h ad previously h eld to b e impermissibly 
vague. 
The government conceded that section 
805(a)(2)(B) does not prohibit advocacy on 
behalf of terrorist groups, nor does it sanction 
association with those groups for advocacy 
purposes. But the statute gives "fair warning" 
that any expert advice or assistance to terrorist 
organizations is forbidden, including medical 
and economic development assistance, as well 
as human rights advocacy activities. 
In ruling for Plaintiffs, the court stressed 
the close relation between AEDPA's "training" 
and "p ersonnel" and the Patriot Act's "expert 
a dvice or assistance." The latter phrase can 
easily be construed to encompass activities 
covered by "training" or "personnel." Given 
that these terms h ave already been h eld to be 
irnpermissibly vague, it follows, argued Judge 
Collins, that their synonym - "expert a dvice or 
assistance" - is also impermissibly vague. 
Notwithstanding the government's 
concession that section 805(a)(2)(B) does n ot 
impinge upon First Amendment liberties, its 
admission that any and all "expert advice 
or assistance" is proscribed would, the 
court declared, lead n ecessarily to som e 
con s titutionally protected activity (su ch as 
petitioning the United Nations on behalf of 
the terroris t organizations) falling within 
the section's scope. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that section 805(a)(2)(B)'s vagueness 
deprived Plaintiffs of liberty without due process 
of law. 
Curiou sly, although the court considered 
section 805(a)(2)(B)'s possible application to 
First Amendment-protected activity to be an 
important factor leading to its conclusion that 
the provision is unconstitutionally vague, the 
court nevertheless denied Plaintiffs ' overbreadth 
challen ge. Plaintiffs h a d argued that the 
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PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CAREERS 
IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
By Mary Moreno 
Special to Motions 
The 19th Annual Southern California 
Public Interest Law Career Day sponsored by 
the various Southern California law schools, 
including USD, was recently held at UCLA. 
Many regional, state and federal organizations 
had tables with brochures and resume-drop 
trays. 2Ls and 3Ls who had previously pre-
registered and submitted resumes were able to 
interview with interested agencies for summer 
and full-time employment. 
One of the more edifying events was the 
morning Panel Discussion. The discussion was 
moderated by Associate Dean R. Scott Wylie 
(Whittier Law School), with participants ranging 
from a mid-level associate in a civil rights 
law firm and the Inspector General of the Los 
Angeles Police Commission to a Skadden Fellow 
at the nonprofit Public Counsel Law Center. 
"expert advice or assistance" provision prohibits 
a substantial amount of protected speech. The 
government countered that Plaintiffs offered no 
examples of ~core political activities" prohibited 
by section 805(a)(2)(B). 
In holding for the government, the court 
stated that the "Patriot Act's prohibition of the 
provision of 'expert advice or assistance' is 
aimed at furthering a legitimate state interest: 
curbing support for designated foreign terrorist 
organizations' activities, which unquestionably 
constitute 'harmful, constitutionallyunprotected 
conduct."' Thus the court concluded that as-
applied challenges to the "expert advice or 
assistance" provision would be sufficient to 
safeguard First Amendment liberties. 
The court also disagreed with Plaintiffs' 
contention that section 805(a)(2)(B) criminalizes 
protected associational activity, and that the 
Secretary of State's authority to designate 
organizations as terrorist is impermissibly 
broad. The court instead held that Plaintiffs' 
"associational" challenge had been ruled upon 
in earlier litigation, . and that theJ.Secretary's 
authority to designate terrorist organizations 
was not tantamount to "unfettered discretion." 
HLP also ·presented significant 
justiciability issues of standing and ripeness. 
The government strongly argued that Plaintiffs 
had no history of prosecution under the 
"expert advice or assistance" provision and 
that they had failed to articulate any concrete 
plan for violating the provision in the future. 
Additionally, the government contended that 
the activities Plaintiffs intended to commit 
were not arguably "expert." Consequently, the 
government claimed that Plaintiffs' case did not 
present an Article III case or controversy. 
Plaintiffs parried arguing that their 
mere fear of prosecu tion was sufficient to 
overcome any standing obstacles in light of the 
less rigid justiciability requirements applied 
in First Amendment cases. Plaintiffs pointed 
to the government's vigorous enforcement of 
the material support provision of AEDPA (as 
amended by the Patriot Act) since the September 
11 attacks. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' intended 
medical and humanitarian activities, su ch as 
making presentations to the UN and providing 
medical expertise, were clearly "expert" within 
the meaning of section 805(a)(2)(B). 
The court found no justiciability 
obstacle. It considered Plaintiffs' plans to be 
more than hypothesis and therefore sufficient 
to overcome the governm ent's ju sticiability 
objections. Although the threat of prosecution 
may not be exceptionally high, in the First 
Amendment context the courts have adopted a 
"hold your tongue and challenge now'' approach 
to permit adjudication of First Amendment 
cases. The court considered Plaintiffs ' 
peacemaking and human rights a dvocacy to be 
arguably "expert" enough to fall within section 
805(a)(2)(B)'s scope. But the court dismissed 
two Plaintiff organizations becaus·e they failed 
to describe their activities sharply enough to 
permit the court to determine whether they 
were sufficiently expert. 
Thus the court granted Plaintiffs' 
injunction precluding enforcement of section 
8 05(a )(2)(B) a gainst the named Plaintiffs only . 
The panelists' comments were frank, realistic 
and far-ranging, worthy of the attention of 
anyone interested in a legal career, let alone a 
public interest law career. 
The panelists were: Mike Evans, a four-
year associate with Brancart & Brancart, a civil 
rights law firm with a concentration on fair 
housing and lending issues; Ines Kuperschmidt, 
a Skadden Fellow at the Public Counsel Law 
Center; Karin Wang, Vice President of Programs 
at the Asian Pacific American Legal Center; 
Andre Binotte, Jr., Inspector General, Los 
Angeles Police Commission; and Bert Voorhees, 
a partner of Traber & Voorhees, a private public 
interest law firm specializing in employment 
discrimination, fair housing, and similar 
issues. 
First, Dean Wylie asked the panelists 
if any had intended public interest as a career 
·while in law school. All responded in the 
affirmative. 
Next discussed was the best way while 
in law school to build a resume attractive to 
public interest law employers. In other words, 
what do employers look for? The main "must 
have" is proof of your choice of public interest 
as a career. Each panelist had been actively 
involved while in law school in public interest 
activities on campus or in the community or 
both. This held true in the nonprofit and for-
profit arenas. Bert Voorhees emphasized that 
for-profit law firms like his also look for work 
experience in a ddition to commitment to social 
change, or some evidence both of passion and 
production/ critical thinking. 
An area of huge concern to 2Ls and 3Ls 
is the present batriers to getting a job in the 
public interest law field. Mr. Evans' comment 
brought down the house: "The biggest barrier 
to getting a job is that we are not hiring." It was 
recognized by all that there is a lack of jobs as 
well as a lack of affordability in terms of pay 
scale. 
Andre Binotte Jr. (Insp ector General of 
L.A. Police Commission) b elieves that "civilian 
oversight of law enforcement is a growing 
field by regional development." The Inspector 
General's Office reviews police misconduct 
reports, all "shooting'' cases (anytime a police 
weapon is discharged on the job), and conducts 
operation audits. Mr. Binotte was appointed in 
May 2003, and he finds that the office is still 
evolving in terms of responsibilities and scale. 
Ms. Kuperschmidt mentioned that 
fellowships are one way through the barrier, 
although it is very competitive; students must 
think ahead and begin to prepare by their 
second year of law school. Another way to jump 
the barrier is to commit to a meaningful amount 
of time in the public interest field while a law 
studen t via internships and externships. 
All the p anelists agreed that candidates 
with language skills truly stand out. While 
almost any language is useful, of cou rse in the 
Southern California area fluency in the Spanish 
language is most prized by employers , followed 
closely by Pacific Rim and Asian languages. 
Ms. Kuperschmidt emphasized that many law 
schools permit transfer of a limited number of 
credits for non-law school courses, and that 
this may be a way for students to obtain or 
polish language skills. 
She also encouraged students to 
maximize the u se of law school credits in 
the form of clinics, practicums, internships, 
externships and clerkships to gain real 
work experience. A Skadden Fellow, Ms. 
Kuperschmidt stated, "You can pass the Bar 
without taking Bar classes in law school" 
providing you take a solid bar review course and 
are the type of student who performs well under 
cramming-type conditions. She cautioned that 
this path was not for everyone-some students 
will perform better on the Bar having taken 
Bar courses in law school- and that ·students 
should know themselves and be confident in 
their study habits and abilities before taking 
this route. 
In terms of making the most of 







_ON BEING A 
GOOD LAWYER 
By James V. Schall, s. J. 
Professor of Government 
Georgetown University 
Special to Motions 
"But while Gallio was · Proconsul of 
Achaia, certain Jews made a concerted attack 
on Paul and brought him before the Tribunal. 
'We accuse this man,' they said, 'of persuading 
people to worship God in a way that breaks the 
Law.' Before Paul could open his mouth, Gallio 
said to the Jews present, 'Listen, if this were a 
misdemeanor or a crime, I would not hesitate 
to attend to you; but if it is only quibbles about 
words and names and about your own Law, 
then you must deal with it yourselves -- I have 
no intention of making legal decision about 
things like that." These words, of course, are 
taken from the eighteenth chapter of the Acts 
of the Apostles. They serve to remind us of 
the fact that St. Paul was not slow to use legal 
means available to him when it was necessary 
to protect himself and his mission from unjust 
treatment. 
To be a good lawyer, however, is it 
enough to be merely a "good" lawyer? To be a 
good lawyer, is it enough to be a "good man?" 
To be a good lawyer, is it helpful or advisable 
or even necessary also to be a good Christian, a 
good Catholic? Is it legal or politic to ask such 
questions , even in a church in a free society? 
Dare we even hint at such a correlation? Is 
law like mathematics in which there can be no~ 
specifically "Christian" approach'? 
The story is told of the famous lawyer 
Rufus Choate, an associate of Daniel Webster, 
about a case involving a Boston shipping 
house. On the witness stand was a crusty Irish 
shipowner. Choate was trying to confuse the 
Irishman by asking him a long and involved 
technical question. According to a spectator 
at the trial, Choate's questioning bobbed all 
around the case and straggled through every 
street in Boston. But the witness remained 
calm and unflappable through it all. When 
Mr. Choate at some length had finished , the 
Irishman leaned forward and, in a voice clearly 
heard throughout the court, asked him, "Mr. 
Choate, will ye be afther repating that question 
again?" 
So let me, following a famous pedagogical 
principle about the mother of studies, repeat 
once more my initial questions: To be a good 
lawyer, is it enough to be a "good" lawyer? To be 
a good lawyer, is it enough to be a "good human 
being"? To be a good lawyer, is it helpful or 
advisable or even necessary also to be a good 
Jew, a good Christian, a good Catholic? 
If goon lawyers can do a great deal of 
good, must it not in logic follow that b ad lawyer s 
can do a great deal of harm? Following Plato, 
lawyers, like doctors, can be "ba d" lawyers in 
two senses: a) they do not know the law, orb) 
they do know the law but skillfully u se it for a 
wrong purpose. And can the evolving system 
under which lawyers become lawyers in the 
first place, the constitutional system itself, 
make it more difficult to be a good lawyer, and 
hence a good human being, particularly when 
our philosophers, unlike Socrates, too often 
teach that good and bad do not constitute a real 
distinction? 
Political philosophers are asking 
this question about the integrity of what, in 
practice, is passing for the Constitution today. 
Not a few h ave the distinct impression that our 
constitutional system no longer has a stable 
grounding in something other than itself, in 
something other than pure will of lawyers, 
judges, or people. This very point -- the 
notion of a constitution grounded only in will 
-- is the most disturbing problem about modern 
democracies 
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But, we might ask ourselves, does not 
·the world love lawyers? Is not law a growth 
industry? In a New Yorker cartoon, we are in 
a well-appointed Manhattan living room. We 
see three persons, two ladies and a broadly 
smiling, self-satisfied, portly gentleman. The 
second lady, evidently a newly arrived guest, 
stands, arms folded, with a most puzzled look 
on her face. The other lady, obviously the wife 
of the gentleman, is quite buoyant. Her arm 
is on her husband's shoulder. She is pointing 
at his ample mid-rift, saying proudly, "Edna, 
this is Frank, my happiness, solace, delight, 
inspiration, comfort, joy, and lawyer." Some 
wives still love their lawyer husbands. 
But does the world love lawyers? Most 
liberal arts universities today, it seems, are 
filled with undergraduates preparing for law 
school. I cannot even begin to count the vast 
number of law school recommendations I have 
Written for good students over the years. I 
sometimes wonder, so much has our lives 
becon:ie politicized, if beq>ming a lawyer ought 
not to be a natural right, something to be issued 
with our birth certificate .. 
On every side, no doubt, we hear 
complaints and worries about the over-
legalization or over-politicization of society. We 
suspect that so many laws are not leading to 
more virtue but to an exclusive identification 
of morality with positive law. Not a few critics 
directly relate the economic decline or prosperity 
of a nation to the relative burden of the law on 
an economy. 
On this topic, I take a bemused delight, 
I must confess, while we are reading Plato in 
class, to pause at the passage in The Republic, in 
which Plato points out that a society filled with 
students of medicine and law is already a sick 
society. On hearing this, the s tudents laugh 
half-heartedly, vaguely wondering whether Plato 
was ever wrong. Plato meant, of course, that 
lack of self-discipline or lack of virtue caused 
many of the medical problems and most of the 
legal and criminal ones in any society. Plato's 
passage still gives us pause even after twenty-
five hundred years; though, I suppose, from a 
self-interested point of view, lawyers could apply 
to themselves de Mandeville's famous remark in 
The Fable of the Bees about economics, that it 
prospered handsomely when vices were most 
flourishing. 
The New Testament, it c;:m be easily 
noticed, is surprisingly filled with many legal 
incidents and precedents. No study of law is 
complete without a detailed look at this record. 
The trial of Jesus before the Roman governor 
Pilate is an obvious instance. We cannot ponder 
John's account of this trial often enough. 
Certain chapters near the end of the 
Acts of the Apostles can be considered. Before 
the law, Paul was fighting to prevent his being 
killed by local para-legal bands out to eliminate 
him. He skillfully presented himself before the 
Roman law courts, before Felix, Festus, and 
Agrippa. 
It is sometimes overlooked how shrewdly 
St. Paul used his Roman citizenship, even 
though he was a Jew, a Pharisee in fact. These 
passages in St. Paul alone are enough to make 
us realize that the New Testament itself, though 
it pioneered the notion that some things do ·not 
belong to Caesar, did not intend to supplant or 
overlook the civil society in which it appeared. 
The sword was given for our punishment, Paul 
taught in Romans. Indeed, Paul recognized 
that Roman civil law, the famous Codex Juris 
Civilis, as it came to be entitled when later set 
down under Justinian, the remote origin of 
all modem legal systems, gave him a certain 
welcome freedom and protection to pursue his 
own mission which required him to go over from 
Asia into Macedonia and on to Rome. 
Thus even though Christians were 
advised to settle disputes among themselves by 
their own institutions and r eligious principles , 
there were times, with St. Paul, when they 
h ad to resort to the Roman courts. When we 
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understand this fact, we still should not forget 
the result of the trial of Jesus or the fate of 
Paul. We should not forget, in the end, the 
sorry record of the lawyers and the judge in this 
most poignant forensic scene of life and death 
before the legally appointed Roman judge and 
politician, whose authority Christ himself said 
would not have existed if it did not come from 
God. 
Do I have any concrete advice for lawyers 
who are Catholic? Indeed, I do. The first thing 
that they have to do, and this will take time 
-and effort, as serious a study as anything ever 
studied in law school, is to learn precisely 
what the Catholic Church teaches about itself. 
If I were but to list the misconceptions and 
downright lies that appear about the Church 
almost daily in our media and even in our 
scholarly journals, it would, I fear, take me 
considerable time. 
The Church, without denying its own 
faults, needs far more effective legal mechanisms 
than we now have to call careful attention to 
and, yes, at times even to prosecute and sue, 
certain false and slanderous statements about 
the Catholic Church. This latter effort is surely 
a task of Catholic lawyers, both individually and 
corporately. We now begin to get public figures 
and appointees who are, by any standard, 
prejudiced and biased against Catholicism as 
such. 
We almost daily have charged to us with 
impunity what analogously, were it to be said 
of Jews or blacks or Muslims, would cause the 
roof to cave in. It is a. commonplace that we 
Catholics are almost the only group that can be 
attacked with no legal or political consequences. 
We do not forget about turning the other cheek. 
But we also do recall about the light shining 
before men. We do not forget that the truth, 
including the truth about ourselves, "the whole 
truth about man," as John Paul II often puts 
it, is to be clearly and accurately stated. We 
have a right and duty to do so, as Peter and 
John already had taught us in The Acts of the 
Apostles. 
In any case, my second suggestion is 
to read . most carefully the General Catechism. 
I think it is the most complete and finest 
statement of th~ contents of the faith ever 
written. It is thorough, clear, to the point. No 
lawyer 's book shelves should b e without it. 
And it is what the Church teaches about the 
essential things that really matter. These are 
not primarily lawyer things, of course, though 
some are. But they are all human things and 
no one can afford to neglect a careful and 
faithful reading of this remarkable document. 
We all h ave time for it. We must make time for 
it. We have on the Throne of Peter the most 
remarkable of popes perhaps ever. He said 
explicitly that this document is m eant for the 
intelligent layman. If even the most average 
lawyer is not that, he should not be in the legal 
profession. 
And at least some lawyers also should 
pay attention to the study of the new Code of 
Canon Law and the Church law itself. They 
will be astonished to learn how much of the 
content and practice of modern government 
derives from canon law. If someone is in any 
doubt, I suggest a reading Professor Harold J. 
Berman's magisterial Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. 
Christof Cardinal von Schonborn, the 
secretary of the commission for drafting the 
General Catechism, remarked that the General 
Catechism is written from the point of view 
of the contents of the faith, that is, what is 
said about God, about the sacraments, about 
the commandments, and about how we pray. 
This is what is handed down to us, what has 
been pondered, defined, and reflected on 
over the centuries by councils, popes, saints, 
theologians, philosophers, and, yes, lawyers. 
We should be astonished that we 
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ever allowed ourselves not to know the truth 
about these things as the Church has taught 
them. So lawyers, like priests, and everyone 
else, need to acquaint themselves with the 
intellectual and legal side of the faith. It is 
a much more fascinating enterprise than we 
might initially expect. We live in a world in 
which the coherent, profound, consistent side 
of our religion is not even known or suspected, 
often not even by ourselves. It is time to put a 
stop to this, beginning with ourselves, both as 
individuals and as organized groups. 
Catholic lawyers, to conclude, can learn 
much by reflecting on this account from the 
twenty-third chapter of The Acts of the Apostles. 
It seems that about forty young militant Jews 
of the area had made a vow not to eat or drink 
until they h ad killed Paul. Paul's nephew got 
wind of this proposed ambush and told Paul. 
Paul called a centurion and asked him to take 
the young man to the tribune. The tribune 
listened to news of the plot. Immediately he 
called two centurions and two hundred troops, 
plus seventy cavalry, to escort Paul by night to 
Cesarea. 
With the centurions the tribune sent the 
following letter to Felix, the Roman governor. 
This is how the letter read: 
Claudius Lysias to his excellency 
the governor Felix, greetings. 
This man has been seized by 
(certain) Jews and would have 
been murdered ·by them but 
I came on the scene with my 
troops and got him away, having 
discovered that he was a Roman 
citizen. Wanting to find out what 
charge they were making against 
him, I brought him before their 
Sanhedrin. I found that the 
accusation concerned disputed 
points in their Law, but that 
there was no charge deserving 
of death or imprisonment. My 
information is that there is a 
conspiracy against the man, 
so I hasten to send him to you, 
and have notified his accusers 
that they must state their case 
against him in your presence. 
This letter is delivered to Felix who read the 
letter. Felix asked Paul what province he was 
from. Paul said Cilicia. Felix said that he would 
hear his case when the accusers arrived. He 
put Paul in protective custody overnight. 
As we know, this same Paul had appealed 
to Rome, was sent there, and eventually 
perished there, the exact circumstances of his 
death we do not know. Paul would not have 
us say that this conclusion to his own life 
prevents us from using the law when we can 
also use it to uphold the Justice that belongs 
to us to teach and practice the truth. We are, 
finally, often told that our era is very different 
from that of Paul and Felix. In a time when 
we are rather vividly aware of scandals in the 
Church that embarrass us all, even as we are 
reminded about inner status of those who are 
to cast the first stone, I leave the subject of good 
lawyers with this one thought -- is our time so 
different? 
With the Irish ship-master, in conclusion, 
let me recall and repeat the beginning passage 
of these reflections from Acts of the Apostles: 
But while Gallio was proconsul of 
Achaia, certain Jews made a concerted 
attack on Paul and brought him before 
the tribunal. "We accuse this man," they 
said, "of p ersuading people to worship 
God in a way that breaks the Law." 
Before Paul could open his mouth, 
Gallio said to the Jews present, "Listen, 
if this were a misdemeanor or a crime, 
I would not hesitate to attend to you; 
but if it is only quibbles about words 
and names, and about your own Law, 
then you must deal with it yourselves 
-- I have no intention of making legal 
decisions about things like 'that." 
On reading such a passage today, it is difficult 
not to admire the stern wisdom of the Roman 
legal mind in seeking to moderate public 
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frictions while not denying that they needed 
to be resolved in their own order. We cannot 
but admire the tribune who sent Paul to higher 
authorities, to Gallio, the proconsul, who had 
"no intention of making legal decisions about 
things like that." 
COLI, from page 1 
could insure only key executives, whose 
untimely deaths might cause real problems for 
the company. 
But a loosening of state rules in the 
1980s allowed for an explosion in a new kind 
of COLI that covers rank-and-file workers, 
known in the insurance industry as "janitors 
insurance" or "dead peasants" insurance. 
Nowadays broad-based COLI plans typically 
continue to insure workers even after they have 
quit the company or retired, making it difficult 
for some to see how the company would suffer a 
loss if these individuals were fo die. 
The practice is as widespread as it 
is little-known. Research by the Wall Street 
Journal found that numerous corporations 
purchase COLI policies on millions oflower-level 
employees, typically without their knowledge. 
The business of selling COLI policies is thriving, 
with premiums growing from $1.5 billion in 
2000 to $2.8 billion in 2001. Among the U.S. 
corporations that have bought such insurance 
are AT&T, Dow Chemical, Nestle USA, Procter & 
Gamble, Disney and Pitney Bowes. 
Insurance executives maintain that 
such policies are perfectly legal. In fact, Herb 
Perone of the American Council of Life Insurers 
argues, "Nobody gets upset when a company 
insures its plant or its fleet of cars or land or 
any other business asset. To think that your 
labor force is not a business asset is extremely 
s hortsighted." 
The appeal of this newer kind of COLI 
is driven by the generous tax benefits allowed 
life insurance generally. Corporations gain not 
merely from the tax-free life insurance benefits 
they receive when current or former employees 
die; corporations also can borrow money against 
these policies. Corporations are not taxed on 
gains from a life insurance policy; thus, COLI 
policies in effect amount to tax-free investments 
for businesses. 
Currently, federal tax law prohibits the 
use of life insurance as a tax shelter if there 
isn't a legitim ate business purpose for having 
it. From the start, many companies have 
asserted that they use COLI to help finance 
looming costs for retirees ' benefits. While the 
IRS can find out about COLI policies directly 
from the companies, disclosure requirements 
aren't tight. Employers do, in fact, u se other 
kinds of COLI to pay for lavish retirement 
benefits for executives. But disclosure rules 
don't require them to distinguish between this 
COLI earmarked for executive benefits and dead 
peasants/ janitors COLI. 
To top it all off, after the September 
11 attacks oil the United States, some of the 
first life insurance payouts went not to the 
victims' families but to employers. Many of 
the details surrounding the payouts have not 
been publicized. But Hartford Life Insurance 
Company's quarterly regulatory filing referen ced 
an after-tax charge of $2 million related to the 
September 11 attacks. Hartford itself has 
confirmed this. 
Many states have quickly moved to put 
restrictions on the use of such policies. Most 
have "advise and consent" laws that technically 
require companies to get workers' permission 
before buying life insurance on them. Even 
then , however, companies may choose to offer a 
small $1,000 or $5,000 benefit for the employee, 
without telling them that the insurance benefit 
the company will receive will be much larger. 
And, if the particular state allows negative 
consent, an employee could be insured unless 
they act within a certain period of time to reject 
the coverage. 
The California Labor Federation last 
year successfully lobbied politicians in the 
state's capital to ban the corporate practice 
of insuring the lives of rank-and-file workers. 
That means that any employer that currently 
holds any corporate life insurance police that 
is prohibited under AB 226 must disclose it to 
the subject employee(s) in writing by March 31, 
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2004. Policies that are already in effect which 
violate AB 226 will become void on the next 
premium payment due date that is on or after 
January 1, 2009, but no later than January 1, 
2010. 
Public Interest, 
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opportunities, the panelists agreed that "focus" 
and "hustle" are very important. They also 
suggested narrowing in on a general sense of 
where you want to go: client work, public policy, 
impact litigation, etc. For example, Karin Wang 
of the Asian Pacific American Legal Center 
stated that her agency has a comprehensive 
social change approach. When first out of 
law school, Ms. Wang worked in litigation for 
a big law firm while staying involved in the 
community public interest issues ~he favors. 
After a few years, she realized she was more 
interested in working for social change. With 
her work experience, and more importantly the 
credibility of her commitment to public interest, 
she found her way to the Asian Pacific American 
Legal Center. 
Networking was mentioned, but it 
was recommended particularly in the public 
interest field that student interest be sincere 
and credible. If your background is in public 
policy, it is unlikely in today's climate that a 
public interest agency focused on client work 
will consider your resume. All the panelists 
encouraged students to make the most of their 
law school Career Services Office and public 
interest centers while in law school. 
ASK MADAM 
GRAMMAR 
Dear Madam Grammar, 
My husband and I have an ongoing (but 
friendly) disagreement about the proper use of 
the verbs "bring'' and "take." I think they can 
be used interchangeably; he says "take" is only 
used when transporting an object away from 
its current position, and "bring" is used when 
returning an object to its original place (as in 
"bring it back''). If that is the case, how do you 
explain "BYOB"? 
-A Friend 
Dear A Friend, 
As the Supreme Court sometimes 
refuses to decide on the merits cases deemed to 
be too contentious, by terming them "political 
questions," so perhaps also should Madam 
Grammar decline to comment upon interspousal 
debates, in the interests of domestic tranquility. 
A happy medium may be found, however, in 
the issuance of a "gramm ar advisory opinion," 
which shall not be binding upon the disputing 
spouses but nonetheless may have some effect 
upon subsequent usage. Having reviewed the 
matter thoroughly, it is Madam Grammar's 
position that your husband has it right. The 
very first definition of to bring is to describe 
the transporting of a thing to the place from 
which the thing is regarded. In my dictionary, 
the meaning of to take in the analogous sense 
is accorded definition number fifteen, and 
even then the end-point of the transporting is 
presumed to be a place distinct from the point 
from which the thing is regarded. Now, given 
that we speak here of grammar, one would be 
hard-pressed to defend this position against 
every possible exception either in theory or 
in practice; for only a small number of rules, 
.generally ascribed to the natural law, can admit 
of no exceptions. And as much as Madam 
Grammar would like to have it otherwise, the 
rules of grammar are not widely considered to 
be of the natural law. Thus "BYOB" can be 
admitted as an exception to the rule established 
above. 
Dear Madam Grammar, 
I hope you will forgive what may appear 
to be an overly fastidious question, but if I have 
learned anything from being an avid reader 
of yours, it is that you of all people are least 
likely to . refuse to answer a grammar-related 
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SUPHEMf. 
BAR REVIEW 
California DVD Video Home Studv 
Bar Review program 
o~o 
' 
Why pay more to watch videotaped lectures in a crowded classroom on someone else's schedule? 
Save money with the only course that puts you in control of your bar preparation. 
We are the only full-service bar review program in California to feature the 
na~ion's best lecturers on your own personal DVD videos. 
Our program includes: 
V DVD video lectures by experienced faculty 
who are experts in their subject areas. 
V Comprehensive outlines for every subject. PiJJ 
FREE PU Multistate Bar Review course 
($295 value), eliminating the need to pay 
extra for supplemental MBE workshops. 
V Free DVD workshops for Essay, Performance Test, MBE. 
V Six practice essays that are individually critiqued 
FREE bonus Strategies & Tactics 
for the MBE workbook. 
by our experienced grading staff. 
V Free course guarantee . 
Free MPRE DVD video and written materials available upon request ($I 0 shipping fee). 
~ ~oa 
I a J . ., . - --!';; (~ \ . \ , • 
;-.~-~ 
e6ei 
OOOi i'o•• -==-· eoo-• 
For more information, to enroll, or to become 
a campus representative, call toll-free 
866-BAR-PREP or visit our website at: 
www.SupremeBarReview.com 
Enroll now and receive a free portable DVD player 
upon payment of your $200 enrollment deposit ($15 shipping fee; model may vary). 
